REFLECTIONS
ON A
LETTER
Writ by a
NAMELESS AUTHOR
TO THE
Reverend Clergy of both Universities,
And on his
BOLD REFLECTIONS
ON THE
TRINITY, &c.

By *Richard Frankland.*

LONDON:
Printed for *A.* & *J. Churchill*, and sold by *F. Bently* Bookseller in *Halifax*, 1697.

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A PREFACE TO THE READER.

EVER since the Divine Oracle sounded the Alarum of War between the Seed of the Woman and Serpent's Brood, Gen. 3. 18. *the Devil and his Agents have spit their Poyson against our blessed Lord Jesus, the Captain of our Salvation. For some Thousands of Years the World was inveloped in the Mist of Ignorance: Heathenism, Barbarism, Scythism, and Hellenism overspread the Face of the Earth: And when the Gospel-Sun appeared in our Horizon, the Heathen raged, Kings and Rulers raised all the Militia of Earth and Hell: And by the joint Conspiracy of Jews and Gentiles, this Son of God was abused, rejected, crucified: And since his Resurrection, by the Power of his God-head, and glorious Ascension to the right Hand of the Majesty on high, What a Number of Hereticks have attempted to pull him down from the Throne of his Glory, and degrade him of his Deity, the most orient Pearl in his Crown? Strange were the Figments of* Gnosticks *and* Valentinians *of old, the Followers of* Simon Magus, *who*

overturned Gospel Revelations by their Æones, Combinations, Conjugations, Genealogies, and unintelligible Imaginations. Cerinthus *and* Ebion *in the first Century, affirmed that Christ was only a Man, begotten between* Joseph *and* Mary: Cerdon *and* Marcion *in the second Century, denied the Verity of Christ's Humane Nature and Sufferings: In the third Century,* Theodosian *also denyed Christ's Divinity:* Artemon *said Christ was not existent before he took Flesh of the Virgin: The* Sabellians *denyed the Three Persons in the God-head: Yea, they affirmed that the Father cloathed himself with our Nature, dyed, called therefore* Patripassians: Samosetanus *also denyed Christ's Divinity: The* Maniches *held the same heretical Opinions, which did at last center in* Arius, *and spread through the World.* A. D. 324. *condemned by the Council of* Nice: Nestorius *contradicted the Personal Union of the Divine and Humane Natures in Christ:* Eutichus *confounded these two Natures, saying,* The Humane was swallowed up by the Immensity of the Divine: *The* Agnoitæ *denyed the Perfection of Knowledge in the Divine Nature of Christ: Others called Christ only the adoptive Son of God; all these had their Followers: Yet God raised up learned Men to oppose and suppress these Hereticks in all Ages: Some of them came to astonishing Ends, by the just Judgment of God, and some by the Sentence of Men, as* Servetus *at* Geneva, A. D. 1652. Gorgius Blandrata, Petrus Statorius *vented pernicious Errours in* Poland, *but the later dissembled, and was found in his Bed with his Neck broken: But the Errours settled in* Faustus Socinus, A. D. 1565.

1565. *born at* Sens: *A witty Scholar got his Uncle* Lælius Socinus's *Books, comes into* Poland, *writes a Book,* De Jesu Christo Servatore, *at* Cracovia, *whereof he boasted, and was answered by several, in a Disputation: The Orthodox confounded the Anti-trinitarians from plain Scripture-Texts, and ancient Writers; so that Religion mightily prevailed: But some falling off to Tritheism, Anabaptism,* &c. *they regarded not what Principles they owned, so they were but Enemies to the Doctrin of the Trinity.*

One thing is observable; several in that confused Company denying Religious Worship to Christ, Socinus *contended with them, but was silenced and baffled by his own Principles, who held that Christ was meer Man, therefore by consequence it would be Idolatry to worship him: There were also several Errours broach'd by* Socinus, *that the Condition of the first Man was Mortal, that there's no original Sin, that Christ was not an High-Priest on Earth, that he made no Satisfaction for Sin, that we are not justified by his Righteousness, but our own, that the wicked shall be utterly annihilated at the last Day: These he contended for in their Synods, and prevailed so by the Help of* Smalcius *and other Artifices, that in 24 Years he got his Opinions enthron'd in* Poland, *which are not rooted out to this Day.*

Whosoever desires to read more of this History of Socinianism, may find much more in Dr. Owen's *Answer to Mr.* Biddle, *and his Preface to it.*

Surely 'tis a thousand Pities that in England, *a* Goshen, *a Land of Light, where the Gospel-Sun hath shined in its Meridian Splendor, such black Fogs should rise out of the*

the bottomleſs Pit as to darken our Horizon: Trinitas, *ſaith one*, eſt veræ Theologiæ Fundamentum, quæ conſequentes omnes fere Doctrinas quaſi animat: *Who ſo denies the Trinity, denies his Baptiſm; for we are baptized in, or into the Name of Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt. It's true, the* Racovian *Catechiſm aſſerts Three, and pronounces them to be no Chriſtians who do not believe it; but deny that there are three Perſons or Subſiſtences in the God-head. But our Divines prove it by the Eſſential Name,* Jehovah, *eſſential Properties, Operations: But ſee more of this in the enſuing Treatiſe.*

The other dangerous and damnable Doctrine is that of denying the Lord that bought us, 2 Pet. 2. 1. *revived out of the Rubbiſh of ancient Hereſies. Who could imagine that* Jews *and* Turks *ſhould be bred in* England? *Denying Chriſt's Divinity doth cut the very Sinews of our Hopes of Redemption and Conſolation: Neither Angels nor Men could have pacifyed God's Wrath, or ſatisfied Juſtice, or brought in everlaſting Righteouſneſs: Such Doctrines undermine and pluck up the Pillars of our Chriſtian Religion; and yet in theſe licentious Days ſuch Hereſies are publickly broach'd by more learned Scholars, and ſome confident* Ignoramus's. *I have read that Quakers ſay, we deny the Perſon of him whom you call Chriſt, and affirm that they that expect to be ſaved by that Chriſt without them, will be damned in that Faith. O horrid Sacrilege, unheard of Impiety!*

Methinks the Queſtion of our bleſſed Lord, that non-pluſt the Phariſees, Mat. 22 45. *ſhould puzzle theſe Antichriſtian Spirits that deny Chriſt's Divinity.* [*If* David *then call him*

him Lord, how is he his Son?] *Is the Son greater than the Father? Surely the God-head of the Meſſiah advanceth him above King* David. *Its true, the Plumb-line of Reaſon is too ſhort to fathom this Myſtery; but where Reaſon cannot wade Faith muſt ſwim, having ſo good a Card and Guide as the Holy Ghoſt: The Trinity of Perſons, and Hypoſtatical Union of God-head and Man-hood in Chriſt, being ſo fully revealed in Scripture, let us hold them faſt, and contend for them as our Free-hold.*

This is the Attempt and Deſign of the enſuing Treatiſe, which was put into my Hands by a very reverend and dear Brother, whoſe Praiſe is in the Goſpel, who is better known to the World by the ſucceſsful Fruits of his indefatigable Labours, ſounding viva voce, *than by legible Characters in Scripture, having ſpent much Time and Strength in his peculiar Province, with much Advantage to the Church of God: His Learning and Capacity elevates him above his Fellows, ſo that he needs no Epiſtle of Commendation from me or any other Perſon; his own Works praiſe him in the Gate, and in the Conſciences of many thouſands: nor doth any* (pruritus ſcripturiendi) *Itch of appearing in Print, prompt him to this Undertaking, but purely a Zeal for God, his Cauſe, Truth, and Glory, and the preventing of young Students being poiſoned with Soul-deſtructive Errours, that have edged his upright Soul, and moved his able Hand to this uncouth Undertaking: It's true, the Manner of handling this Subject is ſomething abſtruſe and intricate; for the Subject is high and profound, and above the Reach of ordinary Capacities; but I hope it may give ſome Satisfaction to the learn-*

learned and ingenuous Reader, and that this and all other Helps Polemical and Practical, may be of Use to the Church, is the Prayer of

March 11. 1697.

Thy Soul-Friend,

O. H.

REFLECTIONS
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Reverend Clergy of both Univerſities,
And on his Bold
Reflections on the Trinity, &c.

IN the beginning of the Introduction, p. 3.. § 1, 2. the Author would make the World believe that his deſign in this Letter is to get the beſt Light and Information he can to promote his Eternal Happineſs; and to engage the Learned Perſons to whom he Writes, to comply with his deſires in taking opportunity to ſatisfy him, and a great number of Pious Men who are affected with the ſame doubts, occaſioned by Diviſions amongſt the Clergy about the Doctrine of the Trinity. On Ch. 1.

Anſw. Had the Author acted with like Modeſty in other parts of his Letter as he does here, there might have been ſome ground to hope, that he had truly deſired for to get his doubts ſatisfied; but when he dares be ſo bold as to Aſſert frequently, that the Doctrine of the Trinity is no better than a bundle of flat Contradictions, Who can believe that he had any other deſign in Writing, than to vent his blaſphemous Invectives againſt the Ever-bleſſed God, Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt?

His Diſcourſe §. 3. is idle vain Diſcourſe; for where will he find any Perſons who pretend to believe they know not what, (*i. e.*) empty ſounds, or words that have no Ideas fixed to them? If he have met with any ſuch Aſſes, he ſhould tell us who they are, and not caſt falſe Reflections upon all thoſe Learned Writers who have writ upon, and by undeniable Proofs from Holy Scripture defended the Churches received Doctrine about the Trinity.

His Diſcourſe p. 4. § 4, 5. is to the like purpoſe, and ſuch wherein he ſhews himſelf a falſe Calumniator; for whereas he would perſwade, that new and wrong Trinities are dayly encreaſing, Authors having ſuch different Ideas of them, that there are almoſt as many Trinities as Writers; and ſo would make it be believ'd, that they do but ridicule the Chriſtian Religion and render it moſt abſurd and irrational, in obliging People to put their truſt in Three they know not what, and to pay Divine Worſhip to each of them, when the meer Light of Nature obligeth Man not to Adore for God any thing but what he believes to be an Omniſcient and an Omnipotent Being, able to Know and Relieve his Wants; and that to pay Worſhip to any thing elſe, is Idolatry.

Anſ. 1. It's a groſs and abominable untruth, that there are almoſt as many Trinities as Writers about them; I could eaſily ſhew that Learned and Orthodox Divines generally do ſweetly accord in their Judgments about the Trinity; and what if ſome few be found who differ from theſe, muſt therefore the Orthodox Doctrine be rejected? Where will he find that Chriſtian Doctrine which hath not been depraved and corrupted by ſome or others?

Anſ. 2. But Secondly, Where will he find ſuch Writers about the Trinity, who would oblige People to put their Truſt in Three they know not what; and to Adore any for God but an Omnipotent Omniſcient Being? As I do believe he cannot find one Writer about the Trinity who doth this, therefore muſt it not be groſs Calumny to Charge all with this?

What follows in p. 4. N. 6, 7. (*viz.*) That the *Trinitarians only agree in the ſame words, that ſcarce three of theſe venture to explain themſelves being of the ſame Mind, and they that have pub-*

publiſhed what they ſuppoſed the Three are, have faln into groſs Contradictions, plain Polytheiſm, or Sabellianiſm, that they deſtroy one anothers Hypotheſes, but raiſe none; needs no other Anſwer than to tell the Author, all ſuch Aſſertions are meer Falſhoods, and ſuch as the greateſt part of his Book is ſtuffed with, as will hereafter be more fully evidenced.

We proceed then to Chapter II. and the Author's Reaſonings upon the *Athanaſian* Creed. And here we muſt tell the Author, that if there be any Jangling amongſt late Writers about the meaning of the word (*Perſon*) it is to be lamented; yet is this no great Argument that they do not believe the *Athanaſian* Creed, Which ſaith, *We are compell'd by the Chriſtian Verity to acknowledge every Perſon to be by himſelf God*; becauſe doubtleſs all the ſaid Writers whatever elſe they may differ in, yet do acknowledge the ſame Chriſtian Verity; yea, we do humbly conceive that there is not any Writer about the Holy Trinity worthy to be taken notice of, but he do's acknowledge a Divine Perſon to be an Uncreate, Eternal, Incomprehenſible, Almighty Being, yea God Bleſſed for ever: And that it would be Idolatry to Worſhip him if he were not ſuch; but the Author in asking, *Is it not a Demonſtration, that thoſe that pay the higheſt Adoration to a Perſon, have no different Ideas of God and a Divine Perſon*? ſpeaks not ſo right and accurately; becauſe altho theſe by Adoring a Divine Perſon do acknowledge him to be God, yet they do not ſay that he is God, as abſolutely conſidered, but as limited by a Relative Property, and ſo the Ideas may differ: Therefore his following Diſcourſe, that we cannot have an higher Idea of God than that he is ſuch a Perſon, and to frame any other, it muſt be one that is lower, and conſequently Blaſphemy againſt God; is but vain, and idle Diſcourſe; for neither the one nor the other of theſe Ideas is either higher or lower, but equal; the one being of God as abſolutely conſidered, the other of him as limited by a Perſonal Property; and this he muſt be either forced to confeſs, or deny that Scripture *Phil.* 2. 6. who *being in the form of God thought it no robbery to be equal with God*; for Ideas of Equals muſt be Equal. On Ch. 2.

Obj. As to what he adds---- *If a Perſon be God there can be no real difference between them*; for which he quotes *Heb.* 1. 3. *Col.* 1. 15.

Anſw. That Phraſe (*Real difference*) is Homonymous; for if by real difference be meant ſuch, as that which is *Rei a Re*, we grant there is no real difference, becauſe God and a Divine Perſon, or firſt and ſecond Perſon, are not different Things or Beings; but if by real difference he mean no more than a true modal diſtinction, in oppoſition to feign'd and imaginary, then we do aſſert ſuch a difference or diſtinction; and the Scriptures by him quoted are ſo far from oppoſing this, that they do clearly evince it, as we ſhall ſee afterwards.

What is contain'd in § 9. is as idle and impertinent; for granting that if a Man be an Animal, all that is contain'd in the Idea of Animal, muſt be contain'd in that of Man; what is this to the purpoſe? But as if he would correct his own Impertinency, he pretends afterwards to ſpeak properly, truly, naturally, (*viz.*) *Man is a Rational Animal, and a Rational Animal is a Man*; *They are only different words to expreſs the ſame Being*; ſo (ſaith he) *a Divine Perſon and God are convertible Terms*; how abſurd this Diſcourſe is will eaſily appear, if the Diſſimilitude of the things compared, be conſidered; Man is defin'd by Rational Animal; Man is the thing defined, Rational Animal the Definition; therefore theſe muſt needs be convertible Terms: But it is not ſo here, for neither is God the Thing defined, and Divine Perſon the Definition, nor is Divine Perſon the Thing defined, and God the Definition; So that its clear they are not in like manner convertible as Man and Rational Animal. Surely the Author for all his pretending to Reaſon, might have been more Logical: But he tells us that

Obj. *Nothing is contain'd in the Idea of God, but what is contain'd in the Idea of a Divine Perſon; and ſo on the contrary: And therefore the Terms are convertible.*

Anſw. The Author is bold and forward in Aſſerting, but as ſlow in Proving what he do's aſſert: Where will he find one who aſſerts the Trinity but he will tell him, That the Eſſence of God as abſolutely conſidered is communicable to three Perſons; but the Divine Eſſence as limited by a perſonal Property

perty is Incommunicable; and is there then no difference in the Ideas of theſe? He may as well tell us that Communicability and Incommunicability are the ſame, which ſure is a downright contradiction. He might do well to give over ſuch bold Aſſertions, till he can make better proof of them; or free them from moſt groſs abſurdity.

Obj. But the Author would perſwade, That *Perſon* being a Term which we give to all Intelligent Beings, either Man, Angel, or God, as we have no different Ideas of Man, and a humane Perſon, or of Angel, and Angelical Perſon, ſo we have the ſame Idea of God, and a Divine Perſon.

Anſw. This will not at all follow, except he could make it out, that Perſonality does flow from the Divine Eſſence after the ſame manner as it doth from the Angelical or Humane Eſſence, which he can never do; for it flows from Angelical or Humane Eſſence, as Finite and Terminated in it ſelf, but ſo it cannot flow from the Divine Eſſence, it being Infinite and Unterminated: Therefore tho Eſſence or Fundamental Subſiſtence in an Angel or Man, being Finite and Terminated in it ſelf, can propagate only one modal Subſiſtence or Perſonality, yet it will not follow by any Rational Conſequence, That the Divine Eſſence or Fundamental Subſiſtence which is Infinite and Unterminated, muſt do the like. Thus you ſee this high pretended Rationaliſt, how weak and vain his Reaſoning is. But you will ſee more of the Poyſon of this Doctrine in that which follows, (*viz.*) *God* (ſaith he) *is in holy Writ deſcribed as a Perſon; and as the Father, who is a Perſon, is God, ſo God* (as appears by a great number of Texts) *is a Perſon*, viz. *the Father: So that it is evident there is nothing more in the Idea of one, than of the other, and are convertible Terms, and only different words which ſignifie the ſelf ſame All perfect Being.* Compare this paſſage with what we find p 32. in his cloſe of the 9th Chapter, *viz. That it is evident, that in Scripture God the Father is as much diſtinguiſhed from the Son, as two Men or Angels can be:* So you ſee its clear, the Author's miſchievous deſign in denying the Bleſſed Trinity, is to overthrow and deſtroy (ſo far as in him lies) The Divinity of Chriſt and of the Bleſſed Spirit: for in making the Perſon of the Father and God

con-

convertible Terms, he excludes the Son and bleſſed Spirit from being God, yea he makes God and the Son to differ as really, as two Men or Angels. So that you ſee his Work is to revive again the long ſince confuted and condemned Hereſies and Blaſphemies wherewith *Arius* did ſo much infeſt the ancient Church, raiſing a dreadful Storm in it. One would think that thoſe many Scripture Texts, which, with greateſt Plainneſs, do hold forth the Divinity of Chriſt and of the Holy Ghoſt, ſuch as *Iſa.* 9. 6. *Joh* 1. 1, 2, 3, 10. *Joh.* 17. 5 *Heb.* 1. 8, 9, 10, 11, 12. *Pſal.* 139. 7. *Act.* 5. 3, 4. 1 *Cor.* 2. 10, 11. with abundance more, ſhould have kept him from ſo daring an Attempt as to vent himſelf in downright Oppoſition to ſo many ſacred Teſtimonies.

As to what follows, p. 6. §. 10. he tells us (1.) That *he hath, according to his weak Ability, vindicated the Honour of a Divine Perſon, and clear'd the* Athanaſian *Creed from ſpeaking ſo contemptibly of him.*

Anſw. The Author's running into groſs Miſtakes about *God* and *Divine Perſon*, argues indeed but weak Ability; but it were well if Weakneſs were the worſt; ſurely his excluding the Son, as well as Spirit, from being God or Divine Perſon, is ſo far from vindicating the Honour of Divine Perſon, that it caſts the vileſt Aſperſions, not only on the ever-bleſſed God, but alſo on holy Scripture, which teſtifies, that Father, Word, and Holy Ghoſt, are one, 1 *Joh.* 5. 7. But when he tells us, he hath cleared the *Athanaſian* Creed from ſpeaking ſo contemptibly of him, (*viz. Divine Perſon*) It's ſtrange if he can believe himſelf, when a little after he tells us, that *this good charitable Creed only damns all thoſe that cannot believe a Divine Perſon is and is not the ſame with God: And that it makes it Damnation not to believe a Difference.*

Is it not evident here, that his Deſign, in Reference to this Creed, is only to ridicule it, and ſo ſet it off, as made up of Contradictions (when yet the Contradictions are not found in the Creed, but only floating in his own Brain) yea, and to make the Compiler of it (the worthy *Athanaſius*) fall under the Fate of Damnation, if he believe his own Creed, as *Sect.* 1? And what is this but to damn all the Chriſtian World

World from the Time that the *Arian* Hereſy was exploded in it, till ſuch time as it was reviv'd again by *Socinus*; yea, and to rob God of a Church during thoſe many hundred Years?

But how comes this great Maſter of Reaſon to be ſo highly conceited of himſelf, as to account all the ancient Fathers, in and ſince the Time of *Athanaſius*, all the learned School-men and reformed Divines, to be a Pack of ſuch ſilly Fools, as to contradict themſelves, to ſay a thing and unſay it again, which is ſaying nothing at all, and to teach the People like Parrots, Propoſitions without apprehending them, and ſuch as are wholly unintelligible, and the laſt of which is a Negation of the firſt? See N. 11. How comes, I ſay, this Man to have this Confidence, or rather, bold Impudence? Is it from the Strength of his Reaſon, or rather, of his Folly? I would willingly reduce his Reaſonings (if they will bear it) to ſome Heads, and then ſeverally conſider the Strength of each of them, for they are but a few, the far greateſt Part of his Book being made up of meer Tautologies.

His firſt Reaſoning *P. 6. §.* 10. is grounded on his own grand Miſtake, *viz.* That *God* (abſolutely conſidered) and *Perſon*, are convertible Terms, ſo that there muſt be as many Gods as Perſons. How falſe this is, hath been before declared and evidenced, ſo that I ſhall not trouble my Reader with it again.

Object. His ſecond Reaſoning immediately follows in the ſame Page, and it ſeems to be to this purpoſe; *If there are Three, each of whom is God, or each of whom is Infinite, Almighty, Incomprehenſible, then there are three Gods, three Almighties, three Infinites*, &c. His Conſequence is moſt abſurd and falſe, becauſe all the three Perſons have but one and the ſame ſingular or numerical God-head, Infinity, Omnipotency, *&c.* for neither is the divine Eſſence, or any Eſſential Attribute of God multiply'd as Perſonality is. But the Author asks, *How do you prove that there are three Almighties, three Incomprehenſible Perſons?*

Anſw. We affirm no ſuch thing, let ſuch prove it as do affirm it; for tho *three* may be affirmed of *Perſons*, becauſe multiplicable,

tiplicable, yet not of *infinite* or *eternal*, which cannot be multiplied; ſo that his Argument is a meer Sophiſm (*viz.*) ſuch as ariſeth *e Conjunctione eorum quæ dividenda ſunt*, and may be anſwered thus, God is three Perſons, but not three Infinites or Eternals; neither will he ever be able, if he had more Skill than he hath, from a Trinity of Perſons in God, if rightly underſtood, to infer Polytheiſm, or a Plurality of Gods.

Object. His third way of Reaſoning (if we may call it ſuch) is *P.* 7. §. 13. The former Part of the Section is a meer Repetition of what went before, and hath been fully anſwered. But in the latter Part of it, he tells us, *That God and Man* (he means according to the Trinitarian Doctrine) *are Univerſals, and ſo predicated of more Perſons than one, and each Divine Perſon is as much of himſelf God* (he means a diſtinct God) *as each Human Perſon is Man* (i. e. *diſtinct Man.*)

Anſw. Never any Trinitarian yet did aſſume God to be an Univerſal, or to be predicated of Father, Son, and Spirit, *per Modum Generis ſeu Univerſalis.* We ſay, as in the Creed, The Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Ghoſt is God; that is, the Father is Eternal God, as with the Perſonal Property of Father, the Son is the ſame Eternal God, but with a diſtinct Perſonal Property (*viz.*) that of Son, the like we ſay of the Holy Spirit: Therefore his Inference, *That Divine Perſons muſt be as much diſtinct as Humane Perſons*, is idle and vain; and it ſtands firm (for all he hath ſaid) that there are not three Gods, but one God.

As to what he adds, §. 15. *That Father, and Son, being Relatives, cannot ſubſiſt in the ſame Subject*, I muſt tell him, that, had he learned his Logick better, he would have found they may, provided they be not predicated *de eodem reſpectu ejuſdem*, which theſe are not.

Object. His fourth way of arguing is, §. 16. *If the Son is the ſame God, as he is that begat a Son, he muſt beget a Son too, except the ſame God did and did not beget a Son.*

Anſw. Although the Son be the ſame as he is that begot, yet he does not beget, becauſe God, as begetting, is God, as cloathed with the Relative Property of Father; now the Son

Son not being cloathed with that Property, doth not beget.

His fifth way of Reaſoning, §. 18. is as fooliſh and abſurd *viz. That if God be three Perſons, and each Perſon God, there muſt be nine Perſons, becauſe each ſingle Perſon muſt be three Perſons.* Had the Author but known and weighed the Deſcription given of a Divine Perſon, *viz. that he is--- eſſentia Dei prout eſt cum Proprietate Hypoſtatica*, he would not have troubled us with ſuch a trifling Argument. For altho God abſolutely conſidered, and not limited by a Perſonal Property, may, by Addition of thoſe Properties, be Three Perſons; yet a Divine Perſon, being God limited by Perſonal Property, cannot be Three Perſons.

His ſixth way of arguing is §. 20. *Thoſe things, according to the common Senſe of Mankind, are the ſame with themſelves that are the ſame with a third, and all Knowledge but Intuitive, depends upon the Truth of it.* We grant him all this: But what is it he would infer? It's this, that if three Perſons and one Perſon, firſt, ſecond, and third, are the ſame with God, they are the ſame with one another: Is this his Demonſtration? I muſt tell him, that through Abuſe of a good Rule, there's nothing but Confuſion and Deceit in it. For 1. He confounds three Perſons and one, as if they were the very ſame. 2. He would make us believe, that they do both alike agree in a third, which is abſurd and falſe, becauſe that Notion we have of the three Perſons jointly conſidered, is adequate to the Notion we have of God, becauſe the Divine Eſſence is not communicable to more than three Perſons: But the Notion we have of a ſingle Perſon is not adequate to the Notion we have of God, who is communicable to more than a ſingle Perſon. Do theſe then agree entirely in a third, when this third hath it ſelf, after a different manner, with reſpect to them? It cannot be: So that the Argument may be retorted upon himſelf, and the quite contrary Concluſion inferred from the foreſaid Rule. Thus, if one Perſon and three Perſons do not agree in a third, then they do not agree between themſelves, but they do not agree in a third (as hath been ſhewn) therefore not between themſelves.

His ſeventh way of arguing, § 21. is to as little purpoſe; *If the Perſons* (ſaith he) *are really diſtinct, and each is God, muſt not each be God diſtinct from the other? For nothing can be diſtinctly predicated of three diſtinct Perſons, if it do not diſtinctly belong to each.* As to the phraſe of *real Diſtinction*, we refer the Reader to what hath been ſaid upon §. 8. But as to what follows, we ſay, That altho God be predicated of three diſtinct Perſons, yet not diſtinctly, or after a diſtinct manner, but one and the ſame God is after one and the ſame manner equally predicated of three, therefore it follows (quite contrary to what he would infer) that there's but one ever bleſſed God, tho three diſtinct Perſons. His 22*d*. Section hath been anſwered over and over.

All that which he adds, §. 23, 24, 27, 28. is wholly founded upon his own groſs Miſtakes, as if it muſt needs follow from a Multiplication of Perſons that there muſt be a Multiplication of Infinities and All-ſufficiencies in God; for ſuppoſe he may find ſome Aſſertors of the Trinity to allow ſuch a manner of ſpeaking, as to call the three Perſons, *three Infinite Perſons*, or *three All-ſufficient Perſons*, yet he knows well enough, in his own Conſcience, that they mean no more than three Perſons, with one and the ſame Numerical Infinity and All-ſufficiency; or which is the ſame, *tres perſonas habentes eandem ſingularem infinitatem & omni-ſufficientiam*: And that they do account it the vileſt Hereſy, yea, even Blaſphemy, to aſſert a Plurality of Infinities and All-ſufficiencies in God; and does it not argue then the Author to be guilty of the vileſt Sophiſm and Deceit; yea, ſuch as is more ſuitable for the Devil, the Father of Lyes, than for any fair Diſputant, from an Homonymous Phraſe that may be taken in different, yea, contrary Senſes, to infer, from ſuch a Senſe or Interpretation as he puts on the Phraſe, Heretical and Blaſphemous Concluſions, as the Concluſions of ſuch Authors, as he knows do take and interpret the ſame Phraſe in a quite contrary Senſe? Let him but take the Phraſe in the Senſe of theſe Authors, and all his monſtrous Concluſions will vaniſh. He can neither infer, that there are three Infinites, or Infinities, or three Infinite Spaces, or three Gods, or that the Trini-

Trinitarians muſt be Idolaters, either in worſhipping ſomething as God which is not God, or in ſetting up a Plurality of Gods, as he would perſwade §. 30. Theſe will be found to be Brats of his own luxuriant Brain, not to be laid at the Trinitarians Door. As to what he adds, §. 31. *That whatever Name we give the three, yea, tho we only ſay three, yet ſo long as we pay Divine Worſhip to each, we own three Gods, becauſe the three are three Objects of Divine Worſhip, and whilſt the one is worſhipped, the other is not worſhipped,* &c. We ſhall anſwer this hereafter, *viz.* P. 24. when we come to confute this falſe and frivolous Charge more largely elſewhere inſiſted on by the Author: Becauſe we do not love, with him, to multiply Tautologies.

Object. There's only one thing more I would take into Conſideration before I leave this Chapter, that I may leave this Author the more inexcuſable in his perverſe Reaſoning ſuch as he makes uſe of, Section 25, 26. His Words are theſe (*viz.*) *There cannot be ſuppoſed in God more Perſons than one, without ſuppoſing an infinite Number; for what Reaſon ſoever moved the firſt Perſon to beget two Perſons equal to himſelf, the ſame Reaſon (becauſe their Nature is the ſame) muſt move the other to beget their Equals, and ſo on to Infinity; for* (ſaith he) *if the firſt Perſon produced two equal to himſelf, it was no doubt an eſſential Perfection of his Nature, otherwiſe he might have choſen whether he would have produced them, and they, when produced, would have had but a precarious dependent Being, ſince they muſt depend on his Pleaſure for their Continuance in Being, as well as for their Being.* And he does further infer, *that if no more Perſons can now be produced, then an Eſſential Property is loſt.*

Anſw. The whole of his Diſcourſe do's clearly evince, that the Author had blind and groſs Conceptions about the Eternal Generation of the Son, and Miſſion or Emiſſion of the Bleſſed Spirit, and therefore it's no wonder to find his whole Diſcourſe made up of thoſe two grand Ingredients, Impudence and Ignorance. For,

1. How ſhamefully does he contradict himſelf, when he tells us, that if the firſt Perſon produced two equal to himſelf, it was no doubt an Eſſential Perfection of his Nature, and yet

(as §. 25.) that it was for ſome Reaſon that moved him to it: How can both theſe hold? If the Act was an Eſſential Perfection, then it was no arbitrary Act; but if it was an Act, to which the Agent was moved by ſome Reaſon, then it was arbitrary and not eſſential: If his Adverſaries ſpoke Contradictions at ſuch a rate as this, he might then have had Ground to have charged theſe on them.

2. What a begetting Act muſt that be, which may, or rather muſt (according to him) be multiplyed into infinite begetting Acts? But had he framed no other Ideas of Eternal Generation, and Eternal Miſſion, but ſuch as might have ſuited with the Nature of the moſt perfect eternal Spirit, he would then have ſeen, that that moſt ſublime and ſcriptural Revelation of three Perſons in the God-head, is not only ſweetly conſiſtent with the higheſt Reaſon, but likewiſe, that it's impoſſible that there ſhould be more than three Perſons in the God-head.

Had the Author but peruſed, and ſeriouſly weighed what is ſaid as to this, by the learned and accurate Doctor *Ames*, in his *Medulla Theologiæ*, *ch.* 5 §. 16. (and which is agreeable to what hath been ſaid before by ancient Fathers, Schoolmen, and modern Divines) ſure he would not have talked at ſuch a rate as he doth; the Doctor here ſpeaking of a Trinity of Perſons in God, hath theſe Words, *viz. poteſt tamen (aliqua ex parte) ſimilitudine adumbrari; Pater nempe eſt quaſi Deus intelligens; Filius Imago Patris expreſſa, eſt quaſi Deus intellectus; Spiritus ſanctus emanans, a Patre per Filium & ſpiratus eſt quaſi Deus dilectus; Filius producitur quaſi per actum intelligendi ex intellectu vel memoriâ fœcundâ Patris; Spiritus ſanctus producitur per actum amandi vel ſpirandi ex voluntate fœcunda Patris & Filii.* What I pray will the Author ſay to ſuch a Diſcourſe as this? (1.) Will he ſay that God doth not know himſelf by a reflex Act of eternal Intellection terminated on himſelf? Surely this he neither can nor dare do. 2. Will he ſay, that God doth not, after a like manner, terminate an eternal Act of Dilection on himſelf? He cannot ſay this. (3.) Can he aſſure us that Perſonalities in God cannot flow from ſuch reflex Acts? I am ſure he cannot. (4.) Are there any more internal and eternal reflex Acts in God, beſides the two before

before mentioned, from which Perſonalities can flow, and can there any more than three Perſonalities flow from theſe in manner aforeſaid, ſuppoſing theſe to emane from the Divine Eſſence, by Mediation of the ſaid Acts? I ſhall freely confeſs here, we could not at all have gone thus far by the dim Light of our own Reaſon, nor could ſo much as have thought on, much leſs, have aſſerted a Trinity of Perſons in the Unity of Divine Eſſence; but when we have the great and everbleſſed God going before us in the infallible Revelation of ſacred Scripture, and aſſuring us, that there be Three that bear Witneſs in Heaven, and that theſe Three are One; that himſelf as Father, did, before the World was, and from Eternity, beget the Son, in the Form of God, and equal to himſelf; that the Holy Ghoſt, in like manner, is God, proceeding and ſent from the Father and Son; we can now ſafely follow God, and improve ſanctified Reaſon to the getting of true and right Notions about this ſublime Myſtery, and for Defence and Vindication of it, and diſpelling the Miſts of thoſe vile Aſperſions and feigned Contradictions, black-mouth'd Hereticks would faſten on it; and we can as truly tell the Author, that however this Myſtery be a very high Myſtery, yet it is not (as he would perſwade) wholly unintelligible, but that we may have true Ideas of the Father begetting, and of the Son's being begotten, and of the Holy Ghoſt's proceeding from Eternity; and that this was not after ſome groſs manner as the Author ſeems to ſuppoſe, but in ſuch a way, as might agree to the moſt pure and ſimple Spirit; yea, we may tell him, that from one and the ſame numerical eternal Eſſence acting upon its ſelf by its internal Acts, and likewiſe terminating thoſe Acts, and ſo laying the Foundations of relative Properties, Three relative perſonal Properties, with the Three bleſſed eternal Perſons, do neceſſarily emane, without the leaſt Appearance of a Contradiction; the divine Eſſence ſo acting or reflecting on its ſelf by eternal Intellection with the relative Property of Generation, as flowing from it, being God the Father: The divine Eſſence as reflected on by, and terminating the ſaid Intellection with its relative Property (of being begotten) being God the Son, the Splendor of the Father's Glory, the

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eternal λόγος, or the expreſs Image of the Father's Perſon, making a full and entire Repreſentation thereof: (And how agreeable is this to many Scripture Phraſes, relating to the the Perſon of the Son?) And the ſame divine Eſſence, as reflected on or terminated by that other Act of the ſame Eſſence, and which may be ſtil'd the Love or Dilection of the Father and Son, with its relative Property of being ſent or proceding, being the third Perſon, or Holy Ghoſt, the amiable Spring-head and Fountain of all that good which God communicates to his Creatures, the all-ſearching, quickning Spirit, *Deus ſpiratus miſſus*, παράκλητος.

And give me leave to ask the Author, our high pretended Rationaliſt (who dares, with his dark and glimmering Light, ſo boldly contradict divine Revelation; telling us, that for the Father to beget, the Son to be begotten, the Holy Ghoſt to proceed; and that theſe Three ſhould be One, and the Son to be equal to God the Father; that ſuch Language is nothing but mere Contradictions, tho the expreſs Language of the written Word.) Let me ask him, I ſay; according to the preceding Interpretation of the Words, what Shew or leaſt Appearance of a Contradiction can he find in them? For the Divine Eſſence, by an eternal reflex Act to know its ſelf; and ſo, by a like act, to love it ſelf, and for the ſame Eſſence to terminate each act, is that which he neither can nor dare deny; becauſe that theſe are eſſential divine Perfections falling under our diſtinct inadequate Notions of the ſame glorious Being, and which can no more ceaſe to be, than God can ceaſe to be God; where then comes in his Contradiction?

Object. Will he ſay, that according to theſe our Notions of a Trinity, it follows that there are but three Perſons, and yet nine Perſons? That they cannot be multiplyed beyond three, and yet may be multiplyed *in infinitum?*

Anſw. The quite contrary follows: For, according to theſe our Notions of the divine Eſſence ſo acting upon it ſelf, as aforeſaid, and ſo terminating the ſaid two internal eſſential acts, (*viz.*) of Intellect and Will; it's impoſſible the Perſons in the divine Eſſence, as flowing from them, ſhould either fall ſhort or exceed the Number Three; becauſe, according to theſe,

theſe, we have (to come up to his own Terms) diſtinct Ideas of ſo many, and neither fewer nor more, (*viz.*) of a Perſon acting or begetting, of a Perſon conceived or begotten, and of a Perſon beloved or proceeding. But will he ſay (as he doth expreſly) §. 26. That,

Obj. If it be not eſſential to the Nature of the Son and Spirit, ſo to produce more Perſons equal to themſelves, their Nature is not the ſame with the Father's, and they want Perfections which he hath?

Anſw. It's eſſential to the Nature of Son and Spirit, as well as of the Father, abſolutely conſidered to be productive of more equal Perſons, tho it be not eſſential to the Nature of the Son and Spirit as limited by perſonal Property; becauſe, by theſe, it's rendred incommunicable, and cannot be ſo productive. Therefore it's very idle what he would infer, that the Nature of the Son and Spirit, is not the ſame with the Father's, becauſe they want Perfections which he has, becauſe the Nature ſtill, whether of Father, Son, or Spirit, abſolutely conſidered as ſuch, hath the very ſame eſſential Perfections, tho, as this is limited by perſonal Properties, importing three Perſons actually to exiſt in it from Eternity, it cannot be ſaid to produce them *de novo*, and to be ſtill productive of them; ſo that we may juſtly ſay here, that whoſoever ſhall affirm, that Eſſence, as common to Father, Son, and Spirit, is not productive of Three Perſons, let him be *Anathema*; and whoever ſhall affirm, that Eſſence, as limited to Father, Son and Spirit, by perſonal Properties, is ſtill productive of Three Perſons *de novo*, let him be *Anathema*; for Eſſence ſo limited, the Three Perſons exiſt as actually produced, and therefore cannot remain to be produced.

Again, will the Author ſay, that the Father now producing no Perſons equal to himſelf, has loſt a Perfection that's eſſential to his Nature, and conſequently ceaſeth to be all-perfect, as §. 26? How vain and idle is all this? When the act of begetting, or producing in God, is eſſential to the divine Nature, and ſo can no more ceaſe to be, than the Nature it ſelf, it being an eternal act identified with the Nature, and an eternal Foundation of ſuch Relation as that of Son to Father, which muſt there-

therefore be continued for ever, the Foundation being continued otherwiſe than in the Creatures.

Having premiſed thus much for Explication of a Myſtery, which the Author moſt blaſphemouſly pretends to be a Myſtery of Anti-Chriſt, wholly inexplicabable and unintelligible; and having ſhewed that however it be a moſt ſublime Myſtery, much tranſcending Reaſon and the Light of Nature, yet being once fully reveal'd in the Word, that it's ſo far from ſtanding in flat Contradiction, to Reaſon and natural Light, that it's found to have a ſweet Conſiſtency with Reaſon and Light of Nature.

On Ch. 3. Having, I ſay, premiſed thus much, I proceed now to his third Chapter of the *Nominal Trinitarians*, as the Author thinks meet (tho without juſt Ground) to ſtile theſe Aſſertors of the Trinity, whom he doth diſtinguiſh from ſuch as he doth after call *Real Trinitarians*.

Here, before I paſs on, give me leave to obſerve, that however moſt orthodox Divines tell us (ſee *Polan. Syntag. p.* 226.) That the Diſtinction of the divine Perſons ought to be the leaſt Diſtinction: Therefore Counſels and Fathers generally ſay, that it's Relation only that makes Diſtinction and Number in God; yet, however, they all agree in Oppoſition to *Sabellius*, that this is not meer nominal, but a true Diſtinction; which will hereafter be further evidenced.

Obj. And, now to come to the Chapter it ſelf; where, firſt, I ſhall take notice of that Paſſage of the Author, *p.* 35. becauſe that being anſwered, the Solution of his other Objections will be very Facile, or rather, the Objections will vaniſh of themſelves: His Words are theſe; *It contradicts our cleareſt Ideas, to ſuppoſe the ſame numerical Subſtance that is in one Perſon, to be at the ſame time in another; and we can as little apprehend what we mean when we ſay the ſame numerical Subſtance conſtitutes three infinite Perſons, as when we ſay, the ſame Subſtance conſtitutes three finite Perſons: Is not the reaſon the ſame between an infinite Perſon and an infinite Subſtance, and between a finite Perſon and a finite Subſtance?*

Anſw. As to that Homonymous Phraſe (*three infinite Perſons*) I have ſhewn before in what Senſe it may be allowed, and

and in what Senſe it may not, and therefore ſhall not here trouble my ſelf or the Reader with it again; but as to the Remainder of his Diſcourſe, I muſt tell him, that altho it contradicts our cleareſt Ideas, to ſuppoſe the ſame numerical finite Subſtance that is in one finite Perſon, to be at the ſame time in another; yet it no way contradicts our cleareſt Ideas, that the ſame numerical infinite Subſtance that is in one Perſon, with one Mode of Subſiſtence, ſhould be at the ſame time in another Perſon, with a different Mode of Subſiſtence. Neither is the reaſon the ſame between an infinite Perſon and infinite Subſtance, and between a finite Perſon and a finite Subſtance. And his Miſtake about this is the Foundation of all his other Miſtakes, and Soul-ruining Errors. That the Reaſon is not the ſame between infinite Subſtance and infinite Perſon, as it is between finite Subſtance and finite Perſon, is evident; becauſe finite Subſtance does propagate modal Subſiſtence (which in rational Nature we call Perſonality) as it's finite and terminated; yea, and where it hath its Terms; but infinite Subſtance, not being ſo terminated, but infinitely excluding all Terms and Bounds, cannot therefore propagate Perſonality in like manner as the finite doth; for that would be to make it imperfect; and if it doth not propagate this after the ſame manner, then it follows undeniably, that the Reaſon is not the ſame betwixt infinite Subſtance and infinite Perſon or Perſonality, as between finite Subſtance and finite Perſon or Perſonality: So that this Author's ſelf-evident Propoſitions will be found to be ſelf-evident Untruths; and his Reaſoning is no better when he would infer, that becauſe the ſame numerical finite Subſtance is but in one Perſon, therefore infinite muſt be ſo too.

Obj. But he would perſwade, that if, by reaſon of the Difference between finite and infinite, there is a Difference between the Number of Perſons, that the Subſtance is in; it would follow, that the Difference of Number is infinite, becauſe the infinite Diſtance betwixt theſe would ſuppoſe this.

Anſw. This Reaſoning of his is vain and falſe as the former, for as Scripture is expreſs in it, that there's Three, and no greater Number of Perſons in God, than three, *viz.* Father, Son, and Spirit; ſo we have ſhewn how ſanctified Reaſon ſweetly complies

with divine Revelation in giving us clear Ideas of it, how Three and no more than Three perſonal Properties may emane or flow from divine Eſſence, as terminating it ſelf by eſſential internal Acts upon it ſelf.

Obj. But ſuppoſe the Author ſhould here object, if three relative Properties or Perſonalities flow from divine Eſſence by means of reflex acts of Eſſence; how comes it to paſs that theſe do not in like manner flow from angelical or humane Eſſence, reflecting on it ſelf after a like manner by the like Acts?

Anſw. There's not the like Reaſon for it. 1. Becauſe theſe internal reflex Acts of Intellection and Dilection in the angelical and humane Nature, are but accidental acts, and moſt frequently intermitted, and therefore cannot propagate Perſonalities; but in the Divine Nature theſe are eſſential eternal acts, and therefore may (I had almoſt ſaid muſt) propagate ſomething (*viz.*) in that Nature whence they emane, and whereon they terminate. 2. Theſe reflex acts in the Creatures, at leaſt in our ſelves, are very imperfect, and cannot produce an expreſs Image of that which reflects, on the Nature as reflected on, and conſequently not a Perſon: But in God theſe are moſt perfect, and therefore produce that expreſs Image which is a Perſon, and ſo the Son is ſtiled, *Heb.* 1. 3. *The expreſs Image of the Father's Perſon.* 3. We have ſhew'd before, that angelical or humane Eſſence being finite, and having Terms, muſt therefore, where-ever it terminates, or where the utmoſt Bounds of its Extenſion are, propagate Modal Subſiſtence or Perſonality for to terminate ſuch Eſſence; but the divine Eſſence, infinitely exceeding all ſuch Bounds and Limits, cannot in this way (ſuited only to a finite Creature) propagate the ſame; but doth it after an higher way, ſuited to infinite immenſe Being. And here I would demand of the Author, either to ſhew us the way wherein infinite eſſence doth this, ſeeing it's undenyable that it muſt be different from this of finite Beings; or elſe give us ſome pregnant Reaſons, why it may not do it by terminating it ſelf upon it ſelf, with the aforeſaid reflex acts; or elſe ingenuouſly confeſs, that a Trinity of Perſons, or which is the ſame, Father, Son, and Spirit in one and the ſame ſingular divine Eſſence

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Obj. And thus, having diſcovered the Falſehood of his grand Concluſion, §. 35. I proceed to take notice of ſome few things more in this Chapter, eſpecially in §. 33. where we find him thus reaſoning.-- *If a Perſon be a Subſtance, there muſt be three Subſtances, becauſe Subſtance is contained in the Idea of Perſon, and conſequently, as many Subſtances as Perſons*; all that we apprehend of a divine Subſtance is, that he is a Subject, in which all the divine Attributes exiſt; that Perſon is the very ſame, and theſe are only different Words to expreſs the divine Being by, whence he would infer (moſt blaſphemouſly) §. 34. *That a Trinity of Perſons in one Subſtance, is nothing leſs than a Trinity of Contradictions.*

Anſw. But I muſt tell the Author, that the whole of this his Diſcourſe and Reaſoning, is full of Confuſion, Deceit, and Error, and might, at leaſt, in Part, have been rectified by himſelf, had he been well vers'd in ſound Philoſophy, and if he had but aſſented to ſome common Maxims granted by learned Men; for, 1. He confounds Subſtance and ſubſtantial Nature or Eſſence, as when he makes it to be the proper Subject of eſſential Attributes: So *p.* 28. of his Book, §. 85. he tells us, *If the Father communicated his Eſſence to the Son, he communicated himſelf, who is no way diſtinct from the Eſſence*; but Philoſophers tell him (ſee *Gliſſon de Nat. Subſt. p.* 6.) that Subſtance is made up of two Principles, which they call *Rudimenta Subſtantialia* (*viz.*) ſubſtantial Eſſence, and modal Subſiſtence, which, in Rational Nature, is call'd Perſonality, and ſo would have taught, that he ought not to confound theſe, *viz.* the Part with the Whole, or *Principium cum Principiato*, which none but a Novice in Philoſophy would have done. 2. Having (as before) confounded or identified compleat Subſtance or ſubſtantial Eſſence, he confounds again this his Subſtance and ſubſtantial Eſſence, with Perſon or Perſonality, contrary to the Rules of all Philoſophy, yea, even of ſuch as relate to created Subſtances (about which he takes his Ideas to

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be moſt clear, and boaſts of them as common Ideas of all Mankind,) for might he not have found Philoſophers not concern'd about the Trinity, from meer Dictates of Reaſon and natural Light, telling him (*viz.*) that *eſſentia ſubſtantialis eſt ſingularis ſubſtantia continens integram individui entitatem.* Or, *abſtracto ſumptam, ſeu totum id quod abſtrahiturè ſuppoſito:* And that Modal Subſiſtence, Suppoſitality, , or (which in Rational Nature is the ſame) Perſonality, is *Modus ab eſſentia ſubſtantiali reſultans, eamq; quodammodo terminans*; and that it is, *Totum id poſt abſtractionem minutilum in ſuppoſito reſiduum, quod eſſentiæ additum eam concretioni reſtituit.* All which is ſo clear, that if he dare yet venture to deny any Part of it, I hope he may, by one familiar Inſtance, be forc't to confeſs the Truth, and correct his Error, or elſe expoſe himſelf to the general Scorn of Mankind: We ſay that *Homo habet Humanitatem*, or which is the ſame, *eſſentiam humanam ſubſtantialem:* It is the common Language of Men, that Man is that Perſon, who hath ſubſtantial humane Eſſence: But ſhould the Author ſay, that *Homo habet hominem*, *that Man hath Man*, or that humane Perſon, which is himſelf, would he not render himſelf too apertly ridiculous to all Mankind? And doth not this undeniably evince, that there is more in the Perſon of a Man as being the *totum cotinens*, than there is in ſubſtantial humane Eſſence, which is but *pars contenta*; for ſubſtantial humane Eſſence can be nothing but Eſſence; but Man beſides that Eſſence hath Perſonality, and is made up of both, as conſtituent Principles; and this is ſtill further evinced, both by the the vulgar Definition that is given of a Perſon, *viz.* that he is, *ſubſtantia intellectualis naturæ ſingularis incommunicabilis*, and alſo by that which Writers in Theology generally give of a divine Perſon, *viz.* that he is, *eſſentia Dei prout eſt cum proprietate hypoſtatica*, or to that purpoſe; and theſe I was more willing to lay down here, not only for fuller Explication of the matter in hand, but alſo becauſe the Author ſeems to call for them, in the Concluſion of his Letter, §. 36. telling us, that according to theſe Ideas we have of Subſtance, or (as he means) ſubſtantial Eſſence and Perſon, it is a flat Contradiction to ſay there are three of the one, and but one of the other; and that if we have

have no Ideas, we talk like Parrots, when we affirm or deny any thing concerning any thing we have no Ideas of: Therefore, 1. I would, by these Definitions, let the Author see (tho he cannot here pretend Ignorance, because they are the vulgar Definitions) that we have Ideas of Substance and Person; yea, clear Ideas, tho not such as his.

2. Whereas he saith, according to those Ideas we have of Substance and Person; he should have said from those gross Ideas, which my self and the Anti-trinitarian Faction have of Substance and Person, such a Conclusion as that before (so blasphemous that I tremble to write it) may be inferred; no wonder, when these say that the Idea of substantial Essence, Substance and Person, is entirely one and the same, and confound one of these with another, contrary to common Sense and Reason, as we have shewn; but for him to say, that according to those Ideas which we have of Substance, Person, *&c.* If he mean the vulgar Ideas of the best and most acurate Divines and Philosophers, as he seems to do; then I must tell him, 1. That it is but one of his cunning false Tricks, by ranking himself in the Number of these, to insinuate into his incautious Reader, that his Idea of Substance and Person are the same with the vulgar Ideas of the best Divines and Philosophers; when it's evident, from the aforesaid Definitions, they are not the same; for his Idea of Person is no way distinct from that of substantial Essence, as he doth expressly acknowledge, when he tells us, *p.* 23. §. 85. *That God the Father is no ways distinct from his Essence*; but now the Idea of Philosophers as well as Divines, according to the said vulgar Definitions, is distinct, because their Idea of substantial Essence, being but one (tho the chief) Rudiment of a Person, doth exclude the Idea of Modal Subsistence or Personality; the other Rudiment, as hath been shewn, when yet the Idea of Person (as is granted) does include both. And I pray then, how are these the same? 2. Having thus declared what our true Ideas are of substantial Essence, Substance, Person, and differenc'd them from his false Ideas; I would now know of him, what flat Contradiction there is in our affirming Three Persons, and yet but one substantial Essence or Substance in God; and we shall see how

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he makes this out, §. 37. He reasons thus. *If the Persons are the same Substance, or* (which is the same in his Sense) *substantial Essence, then the same Substance or substantial Essence, is begotten and unbegotten, and yet neither of these, but proceeding, self-existent, and not self-existent, incarnate and not incarnate*; is this his flat Contradiction? A very Smatterer in Logick would soon tell him, that however it be a Contradiction to say that such *oppositè predicates' possunt attribui eidem, secundum idem, ad idem, eodem modo, & tempore*, yet to say, they may be attributed to the same Subject, provided it be not *secundum idem*, or *ad idem, eodem modo*, is no Contradiction at all, as is granted by all, and as may be evinced by thousands of Instances; why then may not the divine Essence, as it is with the personal Property of Father, be said to be unbegotten, as it is with the personal Property of Son, be said to be begotten, or conceived (and if he mean no more by his self-existent and not self-existent, then the Case is alike: But if he take them in a different Sense, they will not be found to be the distinct Predicates of the divine Persons) and so, why may not the same divine Essence, under a different Mode or personal Property, or as belov'd with a Love of infinite Delight and Complacency, be still the same Essence, but neither as unbegotten, nor as begotten, but as proceeding? And so in like manner, may not the divine Essence, as it is with the personal Property of the Son, be incarnate, and yet the same divine Essence, as it is with the personal Property of Father and Holy Ghost be not incarnate? Is there any thing of Contradiction in all this? No Man that knows what a Contradiction is, unless a deceitful Sophister, who would impose on others his own Sophisms, would assert it; when these contrary Predicates are predicated of the same Subject; not in one and the same respect, but under such different Respects as that Subject hath to different Persons. Are not these very Predicates, *viz.* to be begotten, and not begotten; to beget, and not to beget (to use a familiar Instance) in like manner, truly attributed to the Nature of *Isaac*? Do we not truly say, that as it related to *Abraham*, it was begotten, but did not beget, and as it related to *Jacob*, that it did beget, but was not begotten.--- As to what he adds, *that there could not any Attributes or Modes,*

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or any thing that inheres in a Subſtance be begot, becauſe they cannot ſubſiſt by themſelves: How falſe this is, and contrary to all ſound Reaſon, may appear, even from phyſical Generations, which are no other than ſeveral progreſſive Motions from one eſſential Mode to another; for the Matter it ſelf is not generated, but only the eſſential Mode or Form, which being educed out of the Power of the Matter, does not ſubſiſt of it ſelf, but inheres in the Matter, by Vertue whereof the Compound it ſelf is ſaid to be generated, as being ſpecificated by it. His Diſcourſe in the laſt §. of this Chapter, *viz.* 38. is as vain as the former, yea, it is ſuch as is grounded on a meer Sophiſm, *viz.* that there's no Diſtinction of Perſons in God, becauſe every Perſon is the divine Subſtance, which is three different ways the ſame, that is, three different ways one; whereas if he would have reaſoned fairly, he ſhould have ſaid, that every Perſon is the divine Subſtance, as it is three different ways the ſame or one; but then this Concluſion, as hath been ſhewn, being falſe, which ſhould be the Foundation of all that follows, the whole Superſtructure built on it, as his Multiplication without Addition, and his Subſtraction without Diminution, muſt fall with it, and ſo the Falſehood and Sophiſtry of his other Reaſoning would clearly have been detected as now it is, there being a vaſt Difference betwixt thoſe two ways and Modes of ſpeaking, *viz. every Perſon is that divine Subſtance which is three different ways the ſame* (which imports no more, than that it is that divine Subſtance which ſubſiſts in three Perſons, and which is common to three) *which is a manifeſt Truth; and that every Perſon is the divine Subſtance, as it is three different ways the ſame* (which imports that every Perſon being the ſame with the divine Subſtance, as ſubſiſting in one way, as for example, with that Mode of Subſiſtence which is peculiar to the Son, is the ſame with that divine Subſtance, as ſubſiſting in another way, as for example, with that Mode of Subſiſtence which is peculiar to the Father) which is a manifeſt Untruth: And ſo to father Contradictions on us, he'll ſpeak them himſelf, and then make us ſpeak them whether we will or no.

Obj. Thus, having done with his third Chapter, we proceed to his Reflections on the Adimadverter's Hypotheſis, *chap.* 4. On Ch. 4. *p.* 12.

p. 12. where I ſhall briefly take notice of his trifling Diſcourſe, without taking on me to defend the Animadverter's Hypotheſis, which I have not ſeen, ſave only ſo far as to vindicate it, as here repreſented by the Author, from ſome unjuſt Aſperſions which he ſeeks to caſt upon it; and whereas, §. 39. he tells us, *the common Opinion of the Trinitarians, even from the Beginning* (if we may believe the Animadverter) *has been, that the three Perſons are not three Subſtances, Attributes, Properties, or any real but incompleat Beings,* viz. *three Modes, and if the Perſons are no more than three Modes, then the Difference is but a trifling Difference.*

Anſw. But doth not this Author ſhamefully wrong the Animadverter, in making him ſay, that *the three Perſons are no more than three Modes?* Did ever any Trinitarian or Man of common Senſe talk at that rate? But as if he were afraid of being call'd to account for ſuch falſe Aſperſions, he tells us afterward in the ſame Section, *viz. But it's ſaid, a Perſon is not a meer Mode, but the divine Subſtance with a peculiar Mode.* It's well he's brought at laſt to make a true Repreſentation of the Trinitarians Doctrine, and thereby to confute his own Calumny: And what hath he now to ſay againſt this, that a Perſon is not a meer Mode, but the divine Subſtance, with a peculiar Mode? He ſaith, *that if each Perſon is the divine Subſtance, he muſt have in him all the Modes*; an admirable Inference, *If Perſon be divine Subſtance with one Mode, then he's divine Subſtance, as with all the Modes.* If this be not to ſpeak Contradictions, I know not what is; but he would back his abſurd Inference with a Reaſon, *That Perſon muſt have all the Modes, becauſe he is the divine Subſtance in which the Modes ſubſiſt*; this Reaſon is juſt like the former, as if Perſon, who is the divine Subſtance, as limited with one Mode or relative Property, is the divine Subſtance, not as limited with one, but three relative Modes or Properties: A downright Contradiction. One ſhould think this Man, who is ſo ready to charge others with flat Contradictions, ſhould better have fenced himſelf againſt venting Contradictions at this rate; but before I paſs on, I would take notice of another Paſſage of his in this Section, not much ſhort of the former for Abſurdity,

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wherein, ſpeaking of theſe relative Modes, he ſaith, *two of which may be abſent without the leaſt Alteration in the divine Subſtance or Properties*: He might as well have ſaid, that where there is the Foundation of Sonſhip, yet the relative Property of Son doth not reſult or flow from it; which, according to the Senſe of all Mankind, is impoſſible.

Obj. What the Author ſaith, §. 40. I ſhall take up when I come to the following Chapter, and ſo ſhall next conſider what he ſaith, §. 41. where he reaſons thus. *If there be any Thought, Word, or any of thoſe Actions that are proper to intelligent Beings, that belongs to the one and not to the other, it ſhews that they are more than diſtinct Modes, they are diſtinct intelligent ſubſtantial Beings; and are not the Father and Son in Scripture frequently oppoſed to one another, as intelligent Beings? The Father's knowing and loving the Son, is not the Son's knowing and loving the Father; but each has a numerical diſtinct Knowledge, and conſequently, diſtinct Eſſence.*

Anſw. The whole of this his reaſoning is idle and perverſe like the former, and is grounded on either a groſly ignorant, or a wilful Miſtake of the Trinitarians Doctrine: The divine Acts or Operations, according to theſe, are either *ad intra* or *ad extra*; the Author's Diſcourſe, in the Beginning of the following Chapter, relates to thoſe *ad extra*, where we ſhall conſider them; but his Diſcourſe here, to thoſe *ad intra*, as the Father's knowing and loving the Son, the Son's knowing and loving the Father: Now theſe are acts of the divine Nature or Eſſence as reflecting on it ſelf, and lay the Foundations of relative Properties never to be altered, becauſe from theſe acts and their terms the perſonal Properties reſult, as hath been ſhewn before; therefore, according to his Doctrine, theſe internal acts, are in Nature before the perſonal Properties, or Perſonality: And yet (according to Scripture Phraſe) they are attributed to each Perſon with reſpect to another, in as much as each Perſon hath the divine Eſſence, with its Acts and Operations, under a relative Mode appropriated to him; and ſo the Father is ſaid to love the Son, and the Son to love the Father: How, I pray? What, as this Author would have it, with two acts of Love really and numerically diſtinct, and theſe as flowing

either from two meer Modes, or if not ſo, from two really and numerically diſtinct Eſſences? How abſurd is all this, when it's evident to any Smatterer in Theology, that the internal acts themſelves are of the divine Eſſence, and only their Diſtinction from relative Modes; ſo that there's no need either of more numerically diſtinct Eſſences for Performance of theſe acts, or to have them attributed to meer Modes, or to have the divine Perſon ungodded, and their true Subject deſtroyed, as this Author does vainly and idly pretend. What he adds, §. 42. is to no more purpoſe, unleſs he could prove that we make the divine Acts, Titles, Attributes, of one Perſon really diſtinct from the Acts, Titles, Attributes of another, which he can never do. The Author, in his following §. *viz.* 43. would make the World believe that the Orthodox were forced to this way of explicating themſelves about the Trinity, becauſe they had no other way to keep up the Face of a Trinity, and avoid profeſſing the apparent Tritheiſm of the *Nicene* Fathers, who held the Three Almighty ſubſtantial Perſons, were no otherwiſe one God, than becauſe they had the ſame common Nature, even as Three Men having the ſame Humane Nature, are but one Man.

Anſw. Not to mention here the old falſe Trick of ſeeking from the multiplying of Perſons in God to multiply Subſtances, and Almighties: As to that open Tritheiſm of the *Nicene* Fathers, as holding the Three Perſons, no otherwiſe one God, than as Three Men partaking of one common Humane Nature, are one Man, it is ſuch an impudent ſhameleſs Calumny, that it can deſerve no other Anſwer, than to have the Brand of a notorious Lye ſet upon it; ſuch a falſe and blaſphemous Notion, as that God ſhould be a *Genus* to more divine Perſons, ſo as Man is a *Genus* to ſingular Men, I know not whether it ever entred into the Heart of any; but that it ſhould be the Notion of the *Nicene* Fathers, and entertain'd by them, is ſo expreſly contrary to their Canons, and the Orthodox Doctrine of the Fathers at that time, that it needs no further Confutation.

Obj. As to what is added by the Author, §. 44. (beſides his Reproaches which will light on himſelf) there's nothing but what we have had before over and over, and hath been ſo

ty

fully answered, in our having shewn that the glorious Almighty Being, doth not propagate Personality, by Termination of Extension, so as a finite rational Being doth, and that it's highly consistent both with Scripture and Reason, and that he doth this by the aforesaid reflex Acts, terminated on himself, that no more needs be added here. But, §. 45. he tells us, *that granting there are never so many Modes, yet if each Person has the divine Substance, he must necessarily have all the Modes, because they are Modes of the divine Substance; each Person has the divine Substance as limited by a peculiar Mode, or relative Property, and therefore cannot possibly have all the Modes, quite contrary to what is absurdly inferred by this Author.*

Ans. I come now to Chapter 5. to weigh the Author's Reflections on the Hypothesis of Dr. *W. S.* of the Author of the Trinity placed in its due Light, and the rest of the Nominal Trinitarians. On Ch. 5.

In this Chapter the Author tells us, that *besides the Abettors of this Opinion, there are a great many Trinitarians, who no otherwise differ from the Unitarians but in Name, whose Trinities they not only allow, but contend for:* some of them say (and Dr. *Wallis* hath writ in Defence of it) *That the three Persons are only three external Denominations of God, according to the three different Operations of his Goodness towards his Creatures, in creating, redeeming, and sanctifying them;* a little after he saith, *Others say, that the three Persons are the same in God as Faculties in Man* (viz.) *Understanding, Will, and Memory: Others, that the three Persons are the three Attributes of God, Power, Wisdom and Goodness:* Here you have his Charge. But,

Answ. 1. I shall believe it to be a false Charge, so prone I find him to charge things on the Trinitarians, till such time as he doth quote the Author, at least his Book and Page where the Matter charged is expresly contained. (2.) Tho I readily grant that those three Denominations of Creator, Redeemer, Sanctifier, are three external Denominations of God, according to the different Operations of his Goodness towards his Creatures, in creating, redeeming, and sanctifying them; yea, and that these three different Operations, *Imo omnes operationes ad extra* (according to Scripture, *Joh.* 13.

chap. 5. 17. and the granted Maxim) *ſunt trium perſonarum communes*, yet withal I affirm, that in reſpect of the Order that is amongſt the three Perſons, the Holy Scriptures do in a more ſpecial manner appropriate the firſt kind of theſe Actions, as the Acts of Creation to God the Father, as firſt Perſon; and thoſe which in Nature are next to theſe, as of Preſervation and Redemption, to God the Son; and thoſe which come laſt in Order, as the ultimate compleating Acts, to God the Holy Ghoſt; and accordingly do appropriate the external Denominations of Creator, Redeemer, Sanctifyer, as reſulting from the ſaid Acts. But that any Man of common Senſe holding the Doctrine of the Trinity, ſhould affirm, that the Three Perſons are only three external Denominations of God, according to his ſaid different Operations, I am far from believing. (3.) Tho I grant, that ſome, who aſſert a Trinity of Perſons in God, may tell us, that theſe Three glorious Perſons in God, are repreſented by thoſe three Faculties in Man, *viz.* Underſtanding, Will, and Memory, or theſe three Attributes of God, Power, Wiſdom, and Goodneſs, but that theſe ſhould ſay, that the Three Perſons are the ſame as Faculties in Man, *viz.* Underſtanding, Will, and Memory; or that they are thoſe three Attributes of God, Power, Wiſdom, and Goodneſs, I cannot believe; but ſhall rather account, that he ſaith (till he make it good) a meer Calumny. And now being ſo perſwaded as I am, I might juſtly deſiſt from giving my ſelf any further Trouble in this Place, ſave for ſome few Paſſages in this Chapter, which I may not wholly paſs over: One is in §. 46. A Queſtion grounded on his own falſe Hypotheſis (*viz.*) of there being no other Trinity but of infinite Goodneſs, Wiſdom, and Power, in one divine Being; Hence he puts the Queſtion, *Is it not Idolatry to pay divine Worſhip to three Beings, each of which (ſince each is God) has infinite Wiſdom, Power, and Goodneſs?*

It's granted, that to pay divine Worſhip to Three Beings, whatever Attributes we cloath them with, is Idolatry; but to pay divine Worſhip to Three glorious Perſons, Father, Son, and Spirit, who are one and the ſame divine Being, and ſo equally

equally ſhare in all the glorious Attributes, and infinite Perfections of that Being, is that true Worſhip, which the Holy Scriptures, and the infallibly inſpired Pen-men of it, have preſcribed to us; and to call this Idolatry, is the higheſt Blaſphemy, tending to overthrow the very Foundations of the Chriſtian Religion, and of the Chriſtian Faith.

Obj. But this Author propounds another Queſtion, *viz. If there be but one Being with infinite Underſtanding, is it not unlawful to adore three ſuch Beings, each of which has an unlimited Underſtanding?*

Anſw. If this Author had propounded this Queſtion to Dr. *Sherlock*, or ſome, whom he ſtiles real Trinitarians, he might perhaps have had ſome Grounds for it; but to propound it to thoſe, with whom he hath to do in this Place (when he knows they grant as fully as himſelf, or any Unitarian can do, that it's unlawful to adore Three Beings, each of which has an unlimited Underſtanding) is not only a frivolous idle Queſtion, but on his part very malicious, as importing that thoſe, whom he ſtiles nominal Trinitarians, do this; when he knows the contrary; that he knows the contrary, is evident from his own following Words, wherein he tells us, *that the Trinitarians are really as zealous as they pretend to be, to defend the ſacred Truth of only one divine Being:* Well then, if theſe Trinitarians be zealous Aſſerters of only one divine Being, as well as his Unitarians, how comes he to ask them, *if it be not unlawful to adore three ſuch Beings?* As if they did this, when he knows they abhor it. But this Author will tell us here,

Object. 1. *That it's not in Sincerity, but only in Pretence, that theſe Trinitarians ſeem zealous in Defence of one Being.*

Anſ. If he could make the World believe, that theſe mean the ſame by Being, as they do by Perſon, which in this very Place he does cunningly, but moſt falſly inſinuate in his Jumbling thoſe two Terms together, *Being* or *Perſon*, as if they were the ſame in the Language of Trinitarians as well as Unitarians: Then he might well perſwade, that their Zeal, for Defence of one Being, whilſt they aſſert Three Perſons in God, was but a pretended Zeal; But when he knows that all

theſe

these do assert Three Persons in God, yet but one Being, then what less can his charging these with want of Sincerity in their Defence of one Being, be, but meer Calumny? His other railing Language in this §. hath, for its Foundation, not the true Doctrine of the Trinitarians, but his own ignorant or wilful Mistakes about that Doctrine. But, 2. I proceed to consider, what this Author lays down in the two last Sections of this Chapter, §. 47,48. One while he represents these Trinitarians as such, to whom the Unitarians owe their utmost Acknowledgment for vindicating their way of Worship, and for joyning with them against the Politheists, and disguised Pagans (as Dr. *Sherlock*) Another while as the same with Polytheists or disguised Pagans, or as he means, with the real Trinitarians. Again, he tells us, he knows not under what Head to rank these who will be thought to be neither real nor nominal Trinitarians; he thinks they believe no Trinity at all, that they are forced, in adoring the Trinity, to confess they adore an unconceivable Mystery, which is only worshiping of Words and Sounds, or a Trinity of Cyphers; that if they declare what the Three are, they must inevitably run into Polytheism or Unitarianism; that in saying the first of the Three is God the Father, the second God the Son, the third is God the Spirit, they make them Three Gods, whom they equally adore: And *p.* 16. he asks what these Three are, *Father*, *Son*, and *Spirit*; *Are they three Gods, three Parts of God, three Properties, three Names?* And concludes in a scoffing way, that it seems, *the whole Mystery of the Trinity lyeth in this, tho' every one can tell what each of the three is, yet none can tell what three they are, or how they are three.*

You see how this Author runs on in his old Cant, refusing to take in any Satisfaction as to his Doubts and Queries about the Trinity, which he might have done a thousand times from the Writings of eminent Divines on this Subject, had he been desirous to be informed, or to have had his Doubts satisfied, as he pretends to be. For,

1. Do they not tell him, that the Three, who bear Record in Heaven, *viz.* the *Father*, the *Word*, and the *Holy Ghost*, are Three Persons in one God-head? And does he not know that

that they say so? Why then does he propose those idle Questions, *Are they three Gods, three Parts of God, three Properties or Powers of God, three Names*; and why does he bely them, when in Answer to that Question, *What Sort of three are they*, He makes them say that's impossible to be known?

2. Do they not tell him likewise, that these Three Persons are one and the same great and blessed God, and yet distinguished from each other by personal Properties? that the first Person or Father is God, as limited with the personal Property of begetting or conceiving; that the second is God, as limited with the personal Property of being begotten; that the third is God, as limited with the personal Property of proceeding from Father and Son, and of being sent as Comforter; so that one Person cannot be another Person, and yet all the Three are one and the same blessed God?

Object. 3. Let me add, Is it only these Divines that speak thus, or is it not the divinely inspired Pen-men of the Holy Scripture, who speak the same? The Author of the Epistle to the *Hebrews*, doth he not tell *chap.* 1. *v.* 3. That *the Son is the express Image of his Father's Person*; and can he be a Son, representing as a lively Image, the Person of his Father, and yet not a distinct Person? Doth not St. *John*, *chap.* 1. expressly tell us, *that the Word was made Flesh*, and was this the Father, or the only begotten of the Father? See *v.* 14. *This only begotten of the Father*, when in the Humane Nature he was baptized, was he not a distinct Person from the Person of the Father, testifying of him by a Voice from Heaven, *This is my beloved Son in whom I am well pleased*? And was he not a distinct Person from the Holy Ghost, who descended in a bodily Shape like a Dove upon him? *Luke* 3. 21, 22. And does not our Lord Christ himself, when speaking of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, clearly distinguish these as Three Persons, in telling us, *John* 14. 26. *But the Comforter, which is the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in my Name, he shall teach you all things*; have we not here the Person sending, the Person sent, and the Person in whose Name he's sent? But what need I thus argue for a Distinction of Persons? I don't at all question here, but this Author will readily grant, that the Father, the

Word,

Word, and the Holy Ghoſt, as ſet forth in Scripture, are three different Perſons, for he tells us, P. 32. §. 94. *It is evident that in Scripture, God the Father is as much diſtinguiſh'd from the Son as two Men or Angels can be; and Mankind that are incapable of apprehending Metaphyſical Niceties, cannot but conceive them ſo*; and hence it is (as we have ſhewn before) that he makes God and the Father, or Perſon of the Father, equivalent Terms, ſo excluding the Son and bleſſed Spirit from being God, or equal to the Father, ſo that he owns them no otherwiſe to be Three Perſons, than as three Beings or Subſtances, which do really differ one from another.

Anſw. You will thus ſee at length, what this Author is, and how his ſometimes ſeemingly applauded Unitarianiſm ends in Arianiſm; and the Truth is, the very worſt Dregs of the Poyſon of his Doctrine lye here, not in his denying any Trinity of Perſons, but his denying a Trinity of Perſons in the Unity of the divine Eſſence; he can be well enough content that the Word be the Perſon incarnate, the Holy Ghoſt the Comforter, or Perſon ſent, ſo he can but ſtrip them of their Divinity, or make that Divinity, which the Scripture ſeems (as he grants) to aſcribe to them, to agree to them only in a tropical or figurative Senſe; but to aſcribe this truly to them, together with proper divine Worſhip, this he makes to be Idolatry. Here,

1. I would have it noted (that I may meet with and refute his Railery, which hath diffuſed it ſelf through a great Part of his Pamphlet) that when this Author ſpeaks of the Trinitarian's worſhiping the Three Perſons, as Three diſtinct Almighty Beings, as Three Gods, as Three compleat diſtinct Objects of Worſhip, and as paying at other times divine Worſhip to one of them, and at the ſame time not paying it to another, that all this is meer Calumny, and hath not a Word of Truth in it; they worſhip indeed Three Perſons as they are one and the ſame Almighty Being or God, but not as Three Almighty Beings or Gods, ſuch Tritheiſm they abhor as much as himſelf or any other. They worſhip Three Perſons, what, as three diſtinct Objects of Worſhip? No, but as all three in Conjunction, making up the one great compleat and adequate Object of our Worſhip; they worſhip the Son and bleſſed

Spirit

Spirit as well as Father; but do they, when they worſhip the Son, not worſhip the Father and bleſſed Spirit at the ſame time? Or when they worſhip the bleſſed Spirit, do they not worſhip the Father and the Son at the ſame time, as this Author would Perſuade? That's falſe; yea, it's impoſſible that divine Worſhip ſhould be paid to one of theſe, and not to another, when the Three are but one and the ſame God, bleſſed for ever.

Obj. Here I would ask this Author, when he does in Worſhip apply himſelf to God as our great Redeemer, does he in his ſo doing exclude God our Creator from ſharing in that Worſhip? Or when he doth in a more ſpecial manner apply himſelf to God as our Sanctifier, doth he by ſo doing exclude God our Creator and Redeemer from ſharing in that Worſtip? And muſt he, for this his applying himſelf unto God under theſe different Reſpects, needs be a Polytheiſt and an Idolater? If not, why then muſt Trinitarians be ſuch for applying themſelves in divine Worſhip to the Perſon of the Son, or of the bleſſed Spirit? If he ſay it is becauſe three divine Perſons are three Gods,

Anſw. This is moſt falſe, moſt repugnant to Deſcriptions given by all ſound Trinitarians of divine Perſons, and hath fully been anſwered, and therefore I ſhall here paſs it over as a meer Calumny.

2. I would have it noted, that when the Author tells us, §. 47, *that the Notions of the Trinitarians, when apply'd to the Incarnation and Satisfaction, muſt be very uncouth*; and further, *that when they ſpeak of theſe, and when they endeavour to prove the Spirit and λόγος to be Perſons, that then they are real Trinitarians; that is, ſuch (in his Language) as ſet up three Gods*; and further adds, §. 48. *that theſe, who will be thought to be neither real nor nominal Trinitarians, cannot properly be ſaid to believe any Trinity, except at the moſt a Trinity of Cyphers, and that* (as he thinks) *it cannot be preſumed that Men of ſo great Senſe* (*to mention no other than* Sarum *and* Worceſter) *would aſſert ſo abſurd a thing, but that they knew, if they declared what they ſuppoſe the three to be, they muſt inevitably run into Polytheiſm or Unitarianiſm.*

Anſw. 1. And is there then no Medium betwixt theſe two Extreams? One would have thought that the Writings of ſo many learned Men as have writ on this Subject, if he had not reſolved to have ſhut his Eyes againſt cleareſt Light, ſhould have convinced him that there is. Do not theſe expreſly tell (if we muſt repeat things again) that theſe three are three Perſons; that however three Perſons cannot exiſt in one ſingular finite Eſſence, where Perſonality flows from the Termination of Eſſence, yet three Perſons may exiſt in one ſingular, infinite, immenſe Eſſence, where Perſonality flows from Eſſence after a different manner (which the boldeſt *Arians* and *Socinians* dare not deny.) And if Perſonality does not reſult from divine Eſſence, as it does from created Eſſence, why there may not exiſt three Perſons in the one, when yet there can but one exiſt in the other, it's neither this Author nor any other Man living (how big ſoever theſe may ſwell with Pride) that can ſhew any ſolid Reaſon to the contrary; and when once divine Revelation hath aſſured us it is ſo, who is this Man that dare fight againſt God? Will he tell us, that he hath been in Heaven, or beheld from all Eternity, what God, by eternal Acts, terminated on himſelf, can do or not do? To hear a vile Worm ſo talk as he doth, what horrid Boldneſs is it? Were I minded to do it, I could eaſily inſtance in ſeveral things about the divine Attributes, as difficult to be explicated and fully reſolved as any he can propoſe to Trinitarians about the Exiſtence of three Perſons in the God-head, and what then muſt we, becauſe of this, call thoſe divine Attributes into Queſtion? And rather not cry out with the great Apoſtle, *Oh the Depth!*

2. How uncouth then muſt the Notions of theſe Trinitarians be, when applyed to the Incarnation and Satisfaction, or to the Spirit or λόγος as Perſons? I challenge him or any of his Party, how highly ſoever pretending to Reaſon, to ſhew the Inconſiſtency of theſe Notions, when ſo applyed, with true and right Reaſon; or that any ſuch thing as Polytheiſm (as he vainly pretends) can be inferred from them. Indeed, if one ſhould grant him, that one ſo often begged abſurd Principle of his (*viz.*) *That if God the Son be the ſame God with the Father, then he muſt be the ſame Perſon with the Father; or if he be God, and*

and yet a distinct Person, that he must be a distinct God; Then it were no wonder, if *uno absurdo concesso mille sequerentur.* But when he's told by Trinitarians a thousand times over, *that the Son, altho' he be the same God with the Father, or the same with the Father as to God-head, Nature, Essence, Substance, yet he's not the same with the Father as to personal Property*; *that, altho there be three different Personal Properties in one and the same God-head, yet that same God-head, as limited by one Personal Property, cannot be the same, as limited by a different Personal Property, that is, cannot be the same Person, however it be in it self the same God head still.* And now I pray, why may not one and the same God-head or divine Essence, as it is with one personal Property, be not incarnate, as it is with another, be incarnate; as it is with one be unbegotten, as with another begotten; as it is with one, receive Satisfaction, as with another make Satisfaction; as it is with one send, as with another be sent? He must be quicker-sighted than I, that can see any thing like a Contradiction here; as if contrary Predicates were here affirmed, *de eodem, secundum idem, ad idem*, &c. when it's clear they are not: So that his loud Clamour, *Chap. 6. P. 17. §. 50.* That this Supposition, *That each Person is the same God*, carries with it an innumerable Company of most obvious Contradictions, such as he tells us he will instance in *§. 50, 51.* will be found to be but a meer empty Sound, without any thing of Sense or Reason, and all his pretended most obvious Contradictions vanish into Smoak, as any Smatterer in Logick might easily shew him. That which hath been said, might, I hope, satisfie a judicious Reader, and serve for Answer to such further Cavils and blasphemous Invectives as this Author hath, *P. 24, 25, 26, 27.* and *P. 31. §. 93, 94.* of his Letter, not so much against the Trinitarians, as against the sacred Scriptures and the blessed God, Father, Son, and Spirit, as revealed in Scripture; but I fear his glorying, if I should so much as seem to pass them over. Therefore,

On Ch. 6. Of real Trinitarians. Note, here I shall not concern my self with these, and consequently, not with this or the Author's following Chapters, further than I find him inveighing against the Orthodox Trinitarians

Obj. 1. As to what he saith, *chap. 8. p. 24 §. 74. That none of the Trinitarians besides the Author of the 38 Propositions, can say,*

that any of their Perſons is a moſt perfect God, or a moſt high God, or the only true God, or ſupream God, becauſe there are two others as perfect, as high, as true, &c. will be found to be very idle and trifling, if it be but conſidered, that each Perſon in the moſt bleſſed Trinity, is the moſt perfect, high, wiſe, ſupream God; becauſe the ſame moſt high God with the other two Perſons, and neither a diſtinct God from them, nor they diſtinct Gods from him, as this Author doth falſly ſuppoſe; and if each one be the ſame God with the other, then each muſt be the moſt perfect, high, true, ſupream God.

Object. 2. As to what he ſaith, §. 76. of the ſame Page, *That Trinitarians do imagine, that when Man was made, there was a Conſult of the whole Trinity about that weighty Affair, and that one ſaid to the others, Let us make Man.*

Anſw. The Author might do well to ſpeak out plainly, and tell us, that his Deſign is to quarrel not ſo much with Trinitarians, as with the Holy Scriptures themſelves, for the Words he quotes to quarrel with, *Let us make Man,* &c. whoſe Words are they? Are they the Words of any other Trinitarian, ſave of *Moſes*, *Gen.* 1.26. the infallibly inſpired Penman of that Book, or rather of the bleſſed Spirit himſelf, as ſpeaking by *Moſes*? Our Divines, I confeſs, make uſe of this Scripture for proving a Plurality of Perſons in the Unity of the God-head, and it's a full and clear Scripture for that purpoſe; but I cannot wonder at this Author, if after his bold Attempt of ſtripping the bleſſed Spirit of his Divinity, he proceed to that Height of Blaſphemy, as to make him ſpeak falſly or ridiculouſly in Scripture.

Obj. 3. As to what he adds in the ſame §. that according to the Trinitarians, *the Son, as God, really wanted Glory, and prayed to the Father,* John 17.5. *to give it him,* telling us (in a ſcoffing way) *it is ſtrange that a moſt high God ſhould want and beg of another to ſupply him.*

Anſw. 1. It's falſe, that the Trinitarians ſuppoſe, that the Son, as God, really wanted Glory; they do indeed ſuppoſe, that the Son, as God, being made Fleſh, or taking our Nature on him, by his dwelling in a poor humane Nature, during the State of his Humiliation, had the Glory of his Divini-

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ty much obſcured and eclipſed, ſo that it did not ſhine forth with that Luſtre as before; otherwiſe the eſſential Glory was ſtill the ſame, and there was no want as to this, but only as to its Manifeſtation, which may very well agree to the moſt high God, as this Author himſelf muſt be forced to grant, if he will grant ſuch a Variety of divine Providences towards the Sons of Men, as make his Glory to ſhine forth brightly at ſome times, but ſuffer it to be eclipſed and not manifeſted to theſe at other times. But,

2. Seeing the Author would ſeem ſo quick-ſighted as to find an Argument in this Scripture, *John* 17. 5. againſt the Divinity of Jeſus Chriſt, but ſo ſtark blind as to find none in the ſame Scripture for it; I would therefore improve it a little, for getting the Scales of his Blindneſs removed; and whereas our Lord Chriſt prays, *Glorify me with thine own ſelf, with that Glory which I had with thee before the World was:* Hence I argue; if the Glory that Chriſt the Son had with the Father before the World was, was not the increated Glory of the Son as moſt high God (which this Author does ridicule) then it was but the Glory of a created Being. But that could not be: For,

1. If it was but the Glory of a created Being, then there was a created Being, before Creation, yea, before the firſt Moment of Creation: But that's impoſſible, and the Author himſelf who is ſo good in finding out Contradictions (where there's none) will ſure ſee a Contradiction in this.

The Conſequence is undeniable, for the very firſt Moment of Creation God gave Being or Exiſtence to the Heaven and Earth, as the Phraſe in *Gen.* 11. clearly imports, and yet the Son had his Glory with the Father before this, (*i. e.*) through the boundleſs Tracts of Eternity. Let the Author anſwer this Argument if he can. But (2.) If the Glory which the Son had with the Father before the World, was no other than of a created Being, then it highly concerns this Author to declare what created Being he means; for (1.) it could not be that of his Humane created Being, for Chriſt had no ſuch Being before he was born of the Virgin *Mary*: If then the Glory which the Son had with the Father, before the World was, was the Glory of ſuch Being, it muſt then be the Glory of ſuch

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Being, when there was no ſuch Being; if this be not downright Contradiction, I know not what is.

2. It could not be the Glory of Angelick created Nature, for Scripture is expreſs, that Chriſt took not on him the Nature of Angels, *Heb.* 2. 16. Beſides, Scripture ſets him above all Angels, making him the Object of their Worſhip, *Heb.* 1. 6. yea, in the very ſame Place, where it mentions them as miniſtring created Spirits, it mentions the Son as God having an eternal Throne, and as the great unchangeable Creator of this great World, *Heb.* 1. 7, 8, 10, 11, 12. Now if the Son did exiſt before the World, and yet neither as God, Angel, or Man, I wonder what Species of Beings this Author will reduce him to: He who in Scorn ſo often asks the Trinitarians what a ſomething they mean by a ſecond or third Perſon in the Trinity; may well be asked what a ſomething he means by the Son of God, as having Glory with his Father before the World was, and what a Compound he will make the Perſon of our Redeemer, as conſiſting of an Humane Nature, and of ſome other (yet never before heard of) pre-exiſting Nature? I doubt, before he have done, he'll turn that great Myſtery of God, manifeſted in the Fleſh, into a meer Chimæra; but I tremble to mention ſuch Blaſphemies.

4. As to what this Author adds, *P.* 25, 26, 27. of his Letter, §. 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83. tho I find little beſides idle Repetitions of former Matter which hath already been fully anſwered; yet ſome few Remarks I ſhall make, and 1. Whereas he tells us, *P.* 25. *That it is impoſſible that the ſame numerical Act of Creation could be done by three Perſons, becauſe the ſelf ſame Act could not be done three times, and if one Perſon does an Act, no other can do the ſelf ſame. Anſw.* Such Stuff as this and that which follows, argues the Author's groſs Ignorance about the divine Perſons, whom he ſuppoſeth to be ſeparate divided Beings like Humane Perſons acting *diviſim & ſeparatim*; were this ſo, his arguing would be to purpoſe: But he knows well enough (and ſo his Ignorance will be found to be wilful Ignorance) that the Three Divine Perſons, according to the Doctrine of all Orthodox Trinitarians, are not divided Beings, Minds, Natures, Eſſences, but one and the ame moſt pure and ſimple divine Being, Mind, Nature, Eſ-

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ſence, with three diſtinct relative Properties, which do not ſo much as make any real Compoſition in that one glorious Being, and yet are true Relations ariſing from their proper Foundations in that one moſt ſimple immenſe Being, as he may eaſily underſtand, from what hath been ſaid, if he have a Mind to be informed; and ſo he might have ſatisfied himſelf, that it contradicts no Idea of ours at all, that one divine Perſon does the very ſame numerical Action another does.

2. Whereas in the ſame Page he does inſinuate, *That infinite Divine Wiſdom teacheth Men* (he means according to the ſame Doctrine of the Trinitarians) *that there are two needleſs and uſeleſs Perſons in God himſelf, whoſe Actions are to no manner of purpoſe, only to do what the firſt Perſon is not only all ſufficient to do, but actually and wholly does; that if the Son and Spirit muſt neceſſarily do the ſame Act, they are no other than neceſſary Agents, and all the Power muſt be in him with whom they cannot help doing the ſame Acts he wholly does. Anſw.* This whole Diſcourſe is falſe and impious, and not without greateſt Calumny fixed on Orthodox Trinitarians. For may he not find (if he will but take notice of it) generally averring,

1. That the Second and Third Perſons are ſo far from being needleſs and uſeleſs, that they do as neceſſarily ſubſiſt in the divine Eſſence as the firſt Perſon? 2. That altho the Father has a free Will and Power to do or not do (*viz. ad extra*) whatever he pleaſeth, yet this muſt be ſo underſtood, that he hath this in Union and Conjunction with the Son and Spirit, and not as divided or ſeparated from them? Therefore, what he would infer, that the Son and Spirit muſt neceſſarily do the ſame Act the Father doth; conſequently, that they are no other than neceſſary Agents; that all the Power muſt be in him, with whom they cannot help doing what he wholly does; is idle and blaſphemous, as if the Power of doing, and Will for doing, were the ſole Power and Will of the Father, and not the joint Power and Will of Father, Son, and Spirit; or as if the Son and Spirit did not in entire Conjunction with the Father perform the ſame Act *ad extra*, and with the ſame Freedom, when the Act is the Joynt Act of all Three? And I pray, is that we ſay here the Language only of ſome late Tritarian,

tarians, and not the Language of ſacred Scriptures, yea, and of Chriſt himſelf? What elſe do thoſe Words of our Lord import, *John* 5. 17. *My Father worketh hitherto, and I work*, did not the Father work Miracles? Did not Chriſt work the ſame in Conjunction with him? And does not that Scripture, *John* 1. 1, 2, 3, 14. expreſly affirm, *that the Word (ſtiled the only begotten of the Father) was in the Beginning, was with God, was God, the great Creator and Maker of all things, that without him was not any thing made that was made*? It's a Wonder this Author, when he reads ſuch a Scripture as this, can forbear for to caſt forth Reproaches on the divinely inſpired Evangeliſt himſelf? for could any Trinitarian have, with greater Evidence ſet forth, That, 1. this Word was from the Beginning, and before the Beginning of all created Beings, and therefore from Eternity? 2. That in this Beginning he was with God, and therefore a diſtinct Perſon from God the Father? 3. That he was God, *viz.* the ſame bleſſed God with the Father as to Eſſence? 4. That all things were made by him, and that without him was not any thing made that was made, that therefore the Father did make nothing but in Conjunction with the Word or Son, not in Separation from him, as this Author would have it? And as nothing that was made, was made without this Word, ſo this Word himſelf was not made, except he make himſelf, but is the eternal increated Being: Let this Author ſhew now if he can, what he hath to charge Trinitarians with, which he may not as well charge on this bleſſed Apoſtle.

Obj. But this Author is ſo far from granting the Concurrence of the Son or Spirit to the doing of the ſame Actions with the Father, notwithſtanding Scripture does moſt clearly teſtifie it (as in the Texts before cited) that he does boldly aver, *That this is apparently falſe, the Scripture being full of Actions, eſpecially thoſe they do to one another, as one being ſent by another, their going from, and returning to one another, which is impoſſible to ſuppoſe they all equally concurr'd in*; a little after he adds, *That they* (viz. *Trinitarians*) *cannot deny, but Father, Son, and Spirit act ſeparately* ad extra, *even with reſpect to the Creatures*; and to prove this, he asks, *Did not God the Son take the Man Chriſt into his God-head, when neither of the other took*

him

him into theirs, or were limited to him? He further adds,---- *They are ſo far from being one in a natural Senſe, that there is not ſo much as a moral Union between them; they have different Wills and Inclinations; for inſtance, the firſt Perſon will not forgive Mankind, without having Satisfaction given him by a divine Perſon, nay, they ſay his Juſtice could not be ſatisfied without it; the Son is ſo far from being of the ſame Mind, that he freely offer'd himſelf, to ſuffer to appeaſe the Wrath of the firſt Perſon, and ſtill intercedes to the Father. The third Perſon neither gives nor receives Satisfaction.*

Anſw. 1. I know no divine Actions, *ad extra*, which are expreſſed in Scripture, whether in a proper and literal, or in a tropical and improper Senſe, but they may well enough agree to Father, Son, and Spirit, and they may equally concur in them: It's true, our Lord ſaith, *Joh.* 16. 25. *I came forth from the Father, and am come into the World.* Again, *I leave the World, and go to the Father:* But theſe Words do import no more, than that the Word being made Fleſh, and dwelling in that Humane Tabernacle, did for ſuch time as that Humane Nature was upon the Earth, manifeſt the divine Glory in it, and ſo his leaving the World, and going to the Father, imports no more than his ceaſing from ſuch a Way for Manifeſtation of the divine Glory, and from thenceforth reſerving ſuch Manifeſtation for Heaven, ſtiled God's Throne; ſo this makes nothing at all to the Author's purpoſe, only imports God's making in the Perſon of the Son, Manifeſtations of his Glory after different ways, ſometimes in the Humane Nature on Earth, which is his Footſtool, ſometimes in Heaven, which is his Throne; ſo *Joh.* 14. 26. our Lord ſaith, *but the Comforter, which is the Holy Ghoſt, whom the Father will ſend in my Name, he ſhall teach you all things:* What Action is there, the Words being rightly underſtood, wherein one Perſon may not concur as well as another? If the Author ſay, the Father's ſending the Spirit to teach the Church, is ſuch an Action: I anſwer, The Father's ſending here imports no more than the Father's willing that the Church be taught, and illuminated by the bleſſed Spirit; this being a Benefit which Chriſt hath purchaſed for it, and this teaching, ſuch as in reſpect of Order in

operating, is more especially appropriated to the Third Person; but dare this Author therefore say, that the Father does therefore exclude himself, either from willing, that the Church be taught, or from teaching it himself, when the teaching the Church all things, is such a peculiar Work of God, that as it does infallibly evidence the true Divinity of the Holy Spirit, so the joynt Concurrence of Father, Son, and Spirit, in it: So we see the grand Arguments of this Author against the Trinity, which he thinks to be invincible, are no other than such as do arise from his own Misunderstanding or perverting the Sense of Holy Scriptures. 2 As to that Query of his, wherewith he thinks doubtless to silence all Trinitarians, *viz. Did not God the Son take the Man Christ into his God-head, when neither of the others took him into their's, or were united to him? Answ.* The Author in this, labours under a double gross Mistake of the Doctrine, both of sacred Scripture, and of Trinitarians.

1. In his confounding God-head with Personality: For doubtless the Humane Nature of Christ is truly united to that God-head which is common to the Three Persons; as *divina charismatum communicatis*, and as that Name, *Immanuel*, God with us, or God in our Nature, do clearly import: And as that Scripture, *Act.* 20. 28. *To feed the Church of God, which he hath purchased with his own Blood*, does evince; tho at the same time, it be but united to the Personality of one of these, *viz.* the Son, and (through the Contrivement of eternal Wisdom) be made to subsist wholly, *Subsistantiâ* τῷ λόγῳ, or in the God-head, as limited by personal Property, that so this glorious Θεάνθρωπος might become a meet Representative or *Sponsor* for us.

2. Tho it be granted (for the Reason aforesaid) that only the Person of the Son, did take the Human Nature into his Subsistence; yet this imports no more than passive Reception of that Humane Nature into his Subsistence, which was added or united to it by the real joynt Action of the Three blessed Persons, and wherein they did equally concur, like as they do in other Actions relating to the Humane Nature, See *Psal.* 16. 10. compared with *Acts* 2. 24. Yea, do act joyntly, as well in

in preparing a Body or Humane Nature, for the Perſon of the Son (compare *Heb.* 10.5. with *Luke* 1.35.) as they do in uniting that Perſon with the Humane Nature, *John* 1. 14. *The Word was made Fleſh.* So that you ſee from the undoubted Teſtimony of the Word, into what a ſecond groſs Miſtake this Author is fallen, when he affirms, *that the Three Perſons do act ſeparately, ad extra*, as I have now made appear in that very Inſtance by himſelf, given of the Son's Incarnation.

3. As to what is further objected by him, *viz. That theſe Perſons are ſo far from being one in a Natural Senſe, that there is not ſo much as a Moral Union between them, that they have different Wills*, &c. *Anſw.* This whole Diſcourſe, upon due Search, will be found to be falſe and idle; for whereas he tells us, *that the firſt Perſon*, viz. (*according to Trinitarians*) *will not forgive Mankind, without having Satisfaction given him by a divine Perſon, and that his Juſtice could not be ſatisfied without it, when yet the Juſtice of the Second Perſon can be ſatisfied without it.* How falſe is this? Where will he find any ſuch Trinitarians as ſay, *That the Juſtice of the Second Perſon can any more be ſatisfied than the Juſtice of the Firſt without Satisfaction*? nay, do they not tell him, that the Juſtice of the Firſt and Second Perſon is one and the ſame Juſtice? Should they talk as he makes them, they would be as ridiculous as he could wiſh them. I muſt tell him therefore, that the Act of being offended with the Sins of Mankind, as well as the Works of Creation and Providence, may as truly be attributed to one as to another Perſon, and alike to all; notwithſtanding that in reſpect of Order, in operating, ſome of theſe are more frequently attributed to one, and ſome to another: Nor do we matter for his bold and impudent Scoff, of the Perſons being a Committee of Gods, where ſometimes one is Preſident, and ſometimes another is in the Chair, and that accordingly things run in each of their Names, being well aſſured, that the one great and bleſſed God ſubſiſting according to his infinite Perfection in Three Perſons, *viz.* as Father, Son, and Spirit, may and doth (as Scripture teacheth) for the Manifeſtation of divine Order, in the Operations of the Three Perſons, and for the Conſolation of his People, appropriate in more ſpeci-

al manner, ſome of his great Works, *ad extra*, to himſelf as Father, ſome to himſelf as Son, ſome to himſelf as Spirit, tho all the Three do joyntly and equally concur in all, and this without giving the leaſt Colour for Polytheiſm, or Multiplication of Gods. But he adds, *That the Son*, viz. (*according to us*) *is ſo far from being of the ſame Mind with the Father in requiring Satisfaction, that he freely offered himſelf to ſuffer, even to Death, to appeaſe the Wrath of the Firſt Perſon, and ſtill intercedes.*--- *Anſw.* We have ſhewn that the Son is of the ſame Mind with the Father, in requiring Satisfaction, and we ſhall now ſhew that he is of the ſame Mind, as to the giving of it; for when he comes to give Satisfaction, does he not expreſly tell us, *Pſal.* 40. 7,8. *Heb.* 10. 7,9,10. *I delight, or I come to do thy Will O God, yea, thy Law is within my Heart*? Can any thing be more evident, than that it was the Father's Will, as well as Chriſt's that he ſhould make Satisfaction? And did Chriſt freely offer himſelf to ſuffer even unto Death, before the Hands and Counſel of God the Creator of Heaven and Earth had determined this way of Satisfaction by the Death of Chriſt? See what Scripture ſaith, *Acts* 4.24,25,26,27,28. And do not all ſound Trinitarians ſay the ſame? But this Author ſhould conſider what Trinitarians tell him, that our Lord Chriſt hath an Humane as well as a Divine Nature; that to ſuffer Death and to intercede, are Idioms of the Humane Nature, and muſt not be attributed to the divine Nature of the Son, and therefore he ſhould be cautious how he fathers his own falſe Notions on theſe. And what if Trinitarians ſet forth God as offended with fallen Man, by the Perſon of the Father; God as willing to recover and redeem faln Man, by the Perſon of the Son, for Reaſons before mentioned? Muſt therefore God the Father and Son have different Sentiments about Man's Fall, different Minds and Wills about Satisfaction and Redemption? Nothing more falſe; I hope it's cleared fully, that the Three Perſons in theſe, as in all other real Acts, *ad extra*, do joyntly and equally concur

Obj. But it's yet hoped, by this Author, that he can baffle Trinitarians by their own Conceſſions: *For do not theſe grant* (ſaith he) *That opera Trinitatis ad intra ſunt diviſa?* And he does

does inſtance in the Father's Act of Generation, whereby he gave Being to Son and Spirit, wherein they did not, nor could not act, *And what greater Argument* (ſaith he) *can there be that they are ſeparate Gods, than that they act ſeparately?*

Anſw. Suppoſe that Maxim, *Opera Trinitatis ad intra ſunt diviſa*, ſuch, that taken in a right Senſe, it may be granted; yet that wicked Concluſion he would draw from it, That the Three Perſons act ſeparately, and ſo are ſeparate Gods, does no way follow from it; which himſelf, if he would but weigh the Matter well, would be forced to acknowledge; for what if theſe Acts be divided, this (in a ſound Senſe) imports no more, than that the Divine Eſſence, by its two great Faculties of Intellect and Will, doth exert thoſe two great Acts *ad intra*, one of eternal Intellection of its ſelf, another of eternal Dilection, which Acts yet are ſo divided, that neither the one can formally be ſaid to be the other, nor the Eſſence, as with the one, the Eſſence as with the other; nor the Eſſence as with the Act, the Eſſence as terminating the Act; this is ſo clear, that no rational Man can deny it, and I queſtion not but the Author himſelf will acknowledge it: And yet, theſe Acts, tho thus divided, do not ſo much as imply (as he muſt needs confeſs) any real Compoſition in God, much leſs ſeparate Agents, or ſeparate Gods: Now, if we bring what hath been ſaid, to the Perſons in the Trinity, we ſhall find, that however theſe Acts, *ad intra*, abſolutely conſidered, be thoſe eſſential Properties or Perfections which are as communicable as the divine Eſſence it ſelf, yet if we conſider them as Foundations of relative perſonal Properties flowing and reſulting from theſe Acts, as for example, of that perſonal relative Property of Generation (to inſtance in that which this Author doth inſtance in) and which Generation doth include both the foreſaid internal Act of the divine Eſſence, and alſo the relative Property of God the Father reſulting from it, and giving Denomination to it; then this Act, *ad intra*, ſo limited by relative Property, is the peculiar Act of God as Father, and not of God as Son or Holy Spirit; even as the divine Eſſence it ſelf, abſolutely conſidered, is common to Three Perſons, but as limited by perſonal Property, is peculiar

liar to one; and now I pray, where's our Author's ſeparate Agents, or ſeparate Gods, neceſſary for Performance of theſe Acts *ad intra*, when it's clear that theſe Acts, with the Terms of theſe Acts, are only diſtinguiſhed and divided as before, amongſt the Three Perſons by relative Properties; and where's that Polytheiſm or Multiplication of Gods, which he would ſo gladly charge on Trinitarians? Doth his arguing here flow genuinely from the Doctrine of Trinitarians, or only from the falſe Notions and Dreams of his own Brain? Is there any thing in all this Diſcourſe, affirmed of God, but what may be affirmed, and what himſelf cannot but affirm of every Angel, and of every Humane Soul; ſave with this Difference, that theſe Acts, *ad intra*, in the bleſſed God, being infinite and eſſential, are therefore generative and productive of Perſons in the God-head; when in Angels and Humane Souls, where they are but finite and accidental, they are not productive in like manner: After all this, when it is ſo evident from divine Revelation (without which we ſhould for ever have been ſilent) that the Acts, *ad intra*, as they are in the infinite eternal God, do differ in their Products, ſo as Trinitarians affirm from thoſe Acts, *ad intra*, which are but the Acts of finite Creatures, and when this ſtands in no real Contradiction to Reaſon or the Light of Nature, but, tho tranſcendent to it, yet, when once revealed, is found to ſtand in ſweet Conſiſtency with it; I wonder what it is this Author would be at, unleſs it be, inſtead of ſubjecting himſelf to the written Word and divine Revelation, to take on him to be a Controuler, or rather ſcornful Gain-ſayer of it?

As to his 79. §. we have ſhewn before, that Creation is the Work, tho of one glorious Being, yet as ſubſiſting in three Perſons; and here, tho we readily grant, that there is but one ſupream Preſerver and Governour of all things, yet we muſt tell, or rather let the Scripture tell him, That this ſupream Upholder and Governour of the World, is the great God, Father, Son, and Spirit; Son and bleſſed Spirit, joyntly and equally concurring with the Father in this great Work, and not the Father as ſeparated from them; for this ſee *Heb.* 1. 3. Is not the Son expreſly ſaid here to uphold all things by the Word of his Power? And is not the Saints new Birth, Illumination,

mination, Inſtruction, or Direction, frequently attributed to the Holy Spirit? Can any thing be more evident than that theſe glorious Perſons do act joyntly with the Father in the Preſervation of the Creatures, as well as in their Creation? How falſly then does he conclude, §. 80. *That Creation, Preſervation, and ſupream Government of the Univerſe, demonſtrate that there is but one Divine Perſon*? And that the ſame Concluſion, in his ſaid §. 80. drawn from Adoration, Love, and Gratitude due to God, is as falſe as the former, I have fully before evidenced, *P.* 24. As to his 81. §. I muſt tell him, 1. That all ſound Trinitarians do acknowledge as fully as himſelf or any other, that there is but one divine Being or God, with a Power to know and do all things. 2. That the Heathens were without Excuſe for worſhipping ſeveral. 3. That for him to ſay, that theſe Trinitarians do pay divine Worſhip to more than one neceſſary ſpiritual Being, is a Charge ſo notoriouſly falſe, that Satan himſelf could not have acted the Part of a more falſe Accuſer.

But he tells us, §. 80. *That it can no way allay our Crime to call them Perſons inſtead of Gods, ſince paying divine Worſhip to them does as much rob the only one of his due, as if we called them ſo many Gods. Anſw.* Do we in worſhiping Three Perſons, rob the only one of his Due, when in expreſs Scripture Language, 1 *John* 5. 7. we profeſs that theſe Three are the only One, and the only One is theſe Three, *viz.* Father, Son, and Spirit? If in that Adoration we pay to the Son, and bleſſed Spirit, we ſhould pay it to them as ſeparated from the Father, excluding the Father from ſharing in it, he might have had ſome Colour for what he ſays; but when the Father is not excluded, but does equally ſhare in it; nay, when we do profeſs, that in all that Adoration we do direct to One of the Three, yet we as truly include all the Three, *viz.* Father, Son, and Spirit, as making up the only one compleat and adequate Object of Worſhip, the bleſſed God; even as he who does ſincerely direct his Worſhip to God as Redeemer, does yet truly include God our Creator and Sanctifier; will not his whole Charge be found to be falſe and blaſphemous Calumny? In his 82. §. he tells us, *that not only Unitarians, but all Mankind that worſhip but one divine Being, are greatly ſcan-*

ſcandalized at thoſe Chriſtians that pay divine Worſhip to ſeveral; and he beſeecheth theſe to let him underſtand how the Heathens, in their Devotions did or could do more to diſtinguiſh their divine Beings, than theſe do by praying to each by himſelf, and terminating their Devotion on each? Anſw. If this Author have a Mind to be ſatisfied, I hope I have ſaid enough to ſatisfie him in this, and to let him ſee, that theſe Chriſtians are ſo far from imitating the Heathen in their idolatrous Worſhip of more Gods, that none but a Perſon groſly blinded with Heatheniſh Malice, taking almoſt everywhere his own ſilly and falſe Hypotheſes for granted Maxims, and inferring his Concluſions from ſuch Principles, durſt have ventured to have charged them with it.

Obj. But it is objected, *Do we not in our Creed expreſly ſay, The Son is very God of very God? and how can we, after that, pretend they are the ſame God?*

Anſw. Well enough, for the Creed imports no more than that the Son is the very ſame God with the Father, tho as cloathed with a different relative Property through eternal Generation, he be God of God, in ſuch manner as is largely before declared.

Obj. But he tells us here, *there are a hundred Actions which Scripture relates of one God, and denies of the other two Gods; as God the Spirit deſcending in a Bodily Shape, the Father and Son not deſcending.*

Anſw. 1 Tho that Scripture, *Mat.* 3. 16, 17. does ſignally evidence the Truth of Three Perſons, who in Chriſt's Baptiſm did differently repreſent themſelves, *viz. Voce Pater, Natus corpore, ſtamen Ave*, which made one of the Fathers ſay to one doubting of the Trinity, *Abi ad Jordanem & videbis*; yet no ſuch thing as a Plurality of Gods, can be inferred from any Actions here performed. To mention that which himſelf does inſtance in, *viz.* God the Spirit's deſcending in a Bodily Shape; I ſuppoſe he muſt needs grant here, that Action of deſcending cannot be attributed to God in a proper Senſe, and therefore ſuppoſing the Spirit to be God, as Trinitarians ſay, can only be attributed to him in a tropical Senſe, ſuited to any manner of conceiving, which is ordinary in Scripture; and whatever of Action

it

it may import appropriated here to the Holy Spirit, yet it is but like all other Actions *ad extra*, common to the Three, as we have before fully evidenced, P. 30. where he may find what is here or elsewhere by him objected in reference to these Acts fully answered. But.

Quest. 2. What then does this Author mean in telling of an hundred Actions which the Scripture relates of one God, and denies of the other two Gods? Does he charge Scripture and the divinely inspired Penman of it with Polytheism, or asserting a Plurality of Gods?

Answ. To do him Right, I think this is not his Meaning; but that by one God, he means the true God, and by the other two Gods, two made Gods, such as truly are not God, but only have such a Name, and are falsly advanced to divine Dignity by Trinitarians, whom therefore he charges as Idolaters, yea, as bad or worse than Pagans. More Stuff of like Nature he hath in his *9th. Chapter*, which, tho chiefly intended against Dr. *Sherlock* and his Party, yet towards the Close of it, as §. 93, 94. he does bitterly inveigh against the others as Polytheists and Idolaters, having a Creed not stuffed with so many Lines as Contradictions; yea, and when it's evident (as he tells us) that in Scripture God the Father is as much distinguished from the Son, as two Men or Angels can be. In his 83. §. he adds, *these things are so frequently objected, and so little Care taken to answer them be our Writers, that I thought I could not do better than to represent those to you, that we may (if it be possible) receive a full and satisfactory Answer.*

And now I hope the Christian Reader may fully see what this Author would be at; and I should not thus far have raked into the filthy Dunghil of his Blasphemies, but to make a full Discovery of him, and that even the weaker and more incautious Readers may now see him in his perfect Colours. For such Conclusions as these are clearly deducible from his own Words, and the most candid Construction that can be put on them. *viz.* 1. That God the Son, and God the Spirit, when worshipped by Christians with Divine Worship, become meer Idols. 2. That those Christians who adore these, or either of these, as true God, are as gross Idolaters as Pagans,

who worſhip Stocks and Stones; and in ſome reſpects, more vile than they. 3. That all ſuch as write in Defence of a Trinity of Perſons, in the Unity of divine Eſſence, are ſimple Perſons, fond of venting abſurd and ſilly Hypotheſes, and Books and Creeds ſtuff'd with nothing but flat Contradictions; and what I pray will follow from theſe Concluſions, but that, 1. All Chriſtians in the World, for many hundred Years together, were meer Idolaters, yea, as bad, or worſe than Pagan Idolaters? 2. That Idolatry deſtroying the very Eſſence of a true Church, Chriſt therefore, for about a thouſand Years, *i.e.* from the Time that Arianiſm was exploded by the Chriſtian World, till the time that it was broached anew by *Socinus*, had no true Church? Could any Pagan or Mahometan have diſgorged the Poyſon of a bitter Spirit againſt Chriſt and his Members, at an higher rate than this? But this Man pretends to believe Divine Revelation; let me then expoſtulate the Matter a little with him. Can he caſt all this Dirt on Trinitarians, and not on Scripture and the ſacred Writers of it, yea, on Chriſt himſelf? Is it only Trinitarians that ſay, Chriſt is God equal with the Father; and doth not bleſſed *Paul* ſay the ſame, *Phil.* 2. 6? Is it theſe only that ſay, that we muſt honour the Son as we honour the Father, and doth not Chriſt himſelf ſay the very ſame, *Joh.* 5. 23? Do theſe only tell us that Chriſt the Son is the great Maker, Preſerver, and Upholder of all things, and doth not the great Apoſtle St. *John*, in the firſt Chapter of his Goſpel, and *Paul*, in the firſt Chapter to the *Hebrews* ſay the very ſame? Is it theſe only that ſay, that the Son is the mighty eternal God, and doth not the great Prophet *Iſaiah* ſay as much, Chap. 9. Verſ. 6. ſtiling him the mighty God, the everlaſting Father, or Father of Eternity? Or is it only theſe who pay that ſame Divine Worſhip to the Son, become our Redeemer, which they pay to the Father in Conjunction with him, and do not the innumerable Companies of bleſſed Angels and Saints, yea, ten thouſand times ten thouſand of theſe, with every other Creature in his Kind, pay the very ſame? Let him conſult *Rev.* 5. 11, 12, 13. and he'll find they do; and muſt all theſe therefore be Idolaters? Oh Blaſphemy! And as to the bleſſed Spirit, is it only the

the late Trinitarians who acknowledge his Infinity and Omniſcience, did not the Royal Prophet *David* do the ſame? See *Pſal.* 139. 7, 8, &c. Is it only theſe that declare him to be the true God, the great Searcher of Hearts, and did not the great Apoſtle *Peter*, in the Caſe of *Ananias*, who lyed to the Holy Ghoſt, declare as much, when he told him, *Act.* 5. 3, 4. *Thou haſt not lyed unto Men but unto God?* And did not *Ananias* to his Coſt find it ſo? The Author might do well to conſider, who it is he caſts his blaſphemous Reproaches on; were it only upon a Company of poor frail Men, who poſſibly may err, this were not ſo much, but to caſt theſe on ſacred Scripture, on the infallibly inſpired Pen-men of it, and on glorified Angels, who ſay, and do as much as Trinitarians do; yea, and on Jeſus Chriſt himſelf, and on the Holy Spirit; this is dreadful. Before he had gone thus far, he might well have conſidered what our Lord ſaith, *Mat.* 12. 31. *All manner of Sin and Blaſphemy ſhall be forgiven unto Men, but the Blaſphemy againſt the Holy Ghoſt ſhall not be forgiven unto Men*; or, if it be not too late, I wiſh he might yet conſider it and repent. He pretends, §. 83. that his End in writing was to receive (if poſſible) a full and ſatisfactory Anſwer from thoſe learned Perſons, to whom he writes; and what if ſuch an Anſwer come from one, ſometimes Member of one of thoſe famous Univerſities, to whom he makes his Addreſs? Is not this as much as may ſuffice both for detecting and confuting his fallacious arguing, and for giving ample Satisfaction, if he have an Heart prepared for Reception of it? However this be, thus much I can ſincerely profeſs, that for ſo much of his Letter as relates to thoſe Trinitarians, whom he doth abuſively ſtile Nominal, and who indeed are the ſound and Orthodox Trinitarians, I have been ſo far from overlooking any thing that might ſeem to have any Weight, or to carry any Colour of Reaſon with it, that I have choſen, rather as to ſome of his Objections repeated again and again in different Places, under ſomewhat different Terms, to give Anſwer again and again, rather than ſuffer the incautious Reader to be deluded with them; only thus much I muſt mind the Reader of, that in the whole of this Diſcourſe, I have not medled at all with Dr. *Sherlock*, or thoſe

of his Party who aſſert that the Perſons in the Trinity are Three diſtinct infinite Minds or Spirits, and Three individual Subſtances: And whom this Author ſtiles real Trinitarians: Theſe I confeſs have given too juſt Occaſion of Offence and Scandal to all ſober Chriſtians, who do not ſtand in need of ſuch Weapons for Defence of the Trinity againſt the Extreams, either of *Arius* on the one hand, or of *Sabellius* or the Unitarians on the other; for ſeeing, I find, theſe juſtly cenſured by thoſe learned and worthy Perſons--- The Vice-Chancellor, and Heads of the Colleges and Halls in *Oxford*, in their Decree of *Novemb.* 25. *A. D.* 1695. I do fully acquieſce therein. But as to the Author, with whom I have to do, when I came to that Part of his Letter, *viz.* Chap. 6, 7, 8, 9. which ſeems only to refer to theſe, and ſo had thought to have rid my Hands of him, yet peruſing theſe Chapters, I found ſo many things interwoven relating to the former, whoſe Defence I had undertaken (as if his Arrows were chiefly levelled at theſe) that I did plainly ſee, either I muſt do more, or leave this Author to glory, as if I had left ſome of his chief Arguments unanſwered; which now I hope he will not ſo much as pretend.

And now I would ſhut up my whole Diſcourſe, but that his laſt Chapter about Myſtery, may call for theſe few brief Notes on it, *viz.* 1. That it argues intolerable Pride and Folly in him to prefer Reaſon as in fal'n Man, yea, his own magnifyed Ideas (of things which we have found already to be ſo falſe) to the moſt undoubted Traditions and Revelations of God in the Word, and to make thoſe the Rule and Touchſtone for trying theſe by, as it's clear he doth, §. 11.

2. That it argues higheſt Impudence, and Impiety for him to make, as §. 103. 104. Myſtery, no mark of Chriſt or true Religion, but only of Antichriſt and Irreligion, when yet ſacred Scripture tells him, 1 *Tim.* 3. 16. *that great is the Myſtery of Godlineſs, God manifeſt in the Fleſh*, which clearly ſhews, that there's as well a Myſtery of Godlineſs relating to Chriſt, as a Myſtery of Iniquity relating to Antichriſt.

3. Where-

3. Whereas he rails againſt the Myſtery of the Trinity as a cunningly deviſed Fable, for to keep People in Darkneſs, and make ſuch as were Children, be as Children ſtill, §. 95. I muſt tell him, this is no better than falſe and lying Slander; for he ſees how ready we are to enter the Liſt with him, and to vindicate our Doctrine both by Scripture and Reaſon from all his black Calumnies.

Obj. 4. Whereas he pretends, that there's no Myſtery in Religion, as to the things themſelves, which are revealed, but only as to the manner of them (I ſuppoſe he means not as to their ὅτι, but διότι) ſee his §. 96, 97, 98. and then tells us, that the Myſtery of the Trinity is a Myſtery as to the things themſelves, *i. e.* ſuch wherein we have no Ideas of the things at all, or but ſuch as are contradictory to the true, and contain an Affirmation and Negation of the ſame thing; which he would more fully evidence §. 102. telling us, that to ſay, Three Perſons and one Perſon are the ſame God, is as great a Contradiction as to ſay, Three Perſons and One are the ſame; and that we may as ſoon apprehend a Round Square, or a Mountain without a Valley; which yet Trinitarians would maintain under Pretence of Myſtery; and this when not only Unitarians, but all Mankind that worſhip but one Divine Being, are greatly ſcandalized at them for it is, as §. 82.

Anſw. The whole of what is here objected, hath in the preceding Diſcourſe, been ſo fully anſwered; the Definitions of Perſon in general, and of divine Perſon, ſo clearly laid down; the Difference there is betwixt Subſtance, ſubſtantial Eſſence, and Perſon, ſo fully cleared; His pretended Contradictions (not reſulting from Trinitarian Doctrine (as he would have it (but from his own falſe Ideas about theſe things) ſo clearly refuted and confuted; that I would perſwade my ſelf, would he and thoſe of his Party betake themſelves to an impartial and unprejudiced Conſideration of what hath been ſaid, this, if it had no further Effect, yet would make both him and them for ever hereafter to deſiſt from theſe their loud and lying Clamours againſt Chriſt's Church and faithful Servants; and make them grant, that theſe, by the true Doctrine of the Trinity, are ſo far from multiplying Gods, or Objects of Wor-

Worſhip, that they do not ſo much as attribute to our great and bleſſed God, any Properties, whether abſolute or relative, but what are revealed in the Word, and which being ſo revealed, Reaſon it ſelf, and the Light of Nature, muſt grant to be ſuch, as may flow from the Divine Eſſence, and its eternal intrinſick Acts, if the Perfection of theſe and their infinite Diſtance from finite Eſſence and Acts, be but duly known and conſidered.

FINIS.

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